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MORE EQUAL THAN OTHERS: THE BURGER COURT
AND THE NEWLY ARRIVED STATE RESIDENT
KATHERYN D. KATZ*

In the United States a man builds a house in which to spend his old
age, and he sells it before the roof is on; he plants a garden and lets
it just as the trees are coming into bearing; he brings a crop into
tillage and leaves other men to gather the crops; he embraces a
profession and gives it up; he settles in a place, which he leaves
soon afterwards to carry his changeable longings elsewhere.
Alexis de Tocqueville,
Democracy in America
144-145 (1862)

I. INTRODUCTION

Given the tensions inherent in a federal union which has a restless and
mobile population, it is not surprising that the Supreme Court has repeatedly been faced with the dilemma of having to resolve conflicts
engendered by the claims of newcomers who have been denied an equal
share of a state's resources because of their status as newcomers. Nor is
it surprising that the Court's response has been doctrinally chaotic, given
the strength of the competing claims. The right of a sovereign state to
husband its resources and provide for its citizens as it deems prudent is
challenged by the newcomers' demand for equality -as a right of state
citizenship, no matter how brief the term of that citizenship.
One of the contributions the Burger Court made to constitutional theory'
was its singular treatment of the newly arrived state residents as part of
its equality jurisprudence. The Court afforded this group extraordinary
protection by invalidating legislative acts on the basis of the illegitimacy
*Professor of Law, Albany Law School of Union University. I am indebted to Professors Milner
Ball and Bernard Harvith for their generous and invaluable critiques of an earlier draft of this article.
1. See generally H. SCHWARTZ, THE BURGER YEARS: RIGHTS AND WRONGS IN THE SUPREME COURT
1969-86 (1987); Galloway, The Burger Court (1969-1986), 27 SANTA-CLARA L. REV. 31 (1987).
Numerous works predate Chief Justice Burger's resignation. For a listing of the scholarly writing
on the first 16 years of the Burger Court see D. MAY, A BIBLIOGRAPHY OF THE SUPREME COURT
UNDER CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN E. BURGER (1987).
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of their animating purpose2 rather than the classification's irrationalitythe Burger Court's usual method of upholding equal protection claims
that did not involve a suspect classification or a fundamental right.3
I have selected for extensive analysis a trio of decisions in which the
Burger Court relied upon the illegitimacy of a legislative end to invalidate
state legislative action which granted less favorable treatment to the newly
arrived state resident-Zobel v. Williams;4 Hooper v. Bernalillo County
Assessor;5 and Attorney Generalof New York v. Soto-Lopez.6 In Zobel v.
Williams, the Court invalidated Alaska's dividend distribution scheme
which allocated its benefits to adult residents according to length of stay
in Alaska, holding that the only one of the proffered objectives actually
served by the classification was the impermissible purpose of rewarding
citizens for past contributions. 7 In Hooper v. Bernalillo County Assessor,
the Court on the authority of Zobel invalidated New Mexico's property
tax exemption for those Vietnam era veterans who were resident in the
state prior to a fixed date. 8 And in Attorney-General of New York v. SotoLopez the Court invalidated a veteran's preference, available only to those
2. The Burger Court's intensive scrutiny and condemnation of the goals of legislation has not
been limited to issues of equality. See, e.g., Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84
COLUM. L. REV. 1689, 1689-90 (1984) (stating that in modem constitutional law the most important
clauses of the Constitution--the privileges and immunities, Art. IV, dormant commerce, equal
protection, due process, contract and eminent domain-are "all directed in large part on discrimination based on an impermissible purpose").
3. In order for a distinction to furnish a proper basis for classifications it must "always rest upon
some difference which bears a reasonable and just relation to the act in respect to which the
classification is proposed, and can never be made arbitrarily and without any such basis." Gulf,
Colorado & Santa Fe Ry. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150 (1897). This was the first decision to uphold an
equal protection challenge not involving racial discrimination and to articulate the rationality requirement. For the doctrinal seeds of this requirement see Railroad Co. v. Richmond, 96 U.S. 521
(1878) (dictum that special interest legislation as opposed to general violates equal protection);
Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 2732 (1885) ("Class legislation, discriminating against some and
favoring others, is prohibited, but legislation which, in carrying out a public purpose, is limited in
its application, if within the sphere of its operation it affects alike all persons similarly situated, is
not within the amendment"). Accord Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U.S. 705, 710(1885). For criticism
of a rationality requirement under any constitutional provision, see Linde, Due Process of Law
Making, 55 NEB. L. REV. 197 (1975); see also Barrett, The Rational Basis Standard for Equal
Protection of Ordinary Legislative Classifications, 68 KY. L.J. 845 (1980); Perry, Modern Equal
Protection, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1023 (1979); Michelman, Politics and Values, Or What's Really
Wrong With Rationality Review, 13 CREIGHTON L. REV. 487 (1979); Bennett, 'Mere' Rationality in
Constitutional Law, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 1049 (1979); Bice, Rationality Analysis in Constitutional
Law, 65 MINN. L. REV. 1(1980); Baker, Neutrality, Process, and Rationality: Flawed Interpretations
of Equal Protections, 58 TEX. L. REV. 1029 (1980) and Leeder, The Rationality Requirement of
the Equal Protection Clause, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 639 (1981).
4. 457 U.S. 55 (1982).
5. 472 U.S. 612 (1985).
6. 476 U.S. 898 (1986); Williams v. Vermont, 472 U.S. 14 (1985) also involves the recently
arrived state resident but the complex issues of taxation raised by its facts are beyond the scope of
this Article.
7. 457 U.S. at 63.
8. Hooper, 472 U.S. at 622-23.
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veterans who were New York residents when they entered military service,
as violative of the equal protection rights of resident veterans who lived
outside the state when they entered military service. 9 In order to reach
these results the Burger Court employed an amalgam of doctrinesprimarily from the right to travel cases-doctrines which earlier Courts
had developed in order to guard against state interference with the proper
functioning of the federal system,' 0 or to protect against poverty-based
discrimination," or to limit governmental use of "unconstitutional conditions" on the exercise of political and civil rights guaranteed by the
first eight amendments.' 2
In the final analysis, all three of the recent decisions are bottomed on
a belief that the command of equal protection prohibits a state from acting
to reward residents for their past contributions to the common weal. The
foundation of such a belief is not self-evident nor does it leap from the
pages of the opinions. The legal literature abounds with commentary on
the unpredictability of the Court's equality jurisprudence and criticism
of its failure to adhere to a uniform and consistent standard of review for
equal protection claims. 3 Extensive analysis of many of the right to travel
cases discussed herein is also available. " My criticism, however, is not
directed at the uncertain intensity of judicial scrutiny of equal protection
9. 476 U.S. at 911.
10. See, e.g.. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618,629 (1969) in which Justice Brennan supports
his assertion that "the purpose of inhibiting migration by needy persons into the State is constitutionally impermissible," id. at 629, by citing decisions which grounded the right to travel in art.
IV, § 2's Privileges and Immunities Clause, Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 552 (C.C.E.D Pa.
1825) (No. 3230); Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 180 (1869) and Ward v. Maryland, 79
U.S. (12 Wall.) 418, 430 (1871); Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 79 (1873); by citing
cases in which some justices grounded the right in the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges and
Immunities Clause, Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1868); the concurrences of Douglas
and Jackson, J.J., in Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 181, 183-85 (1941); and by citing cases
in which a commerce clause analysis was used, Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849);
Edwards, 314 U.S. at 172 n.l. Edwards had relied upon Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig Inc., 294 U.S.
511 (1935) (commerce clause prohibits state price law designed to suppress consequences of competition between the states as violative of national market theory.)
11. See infra notes 63-91 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
13. As Justice Powell noted "The Equal Protection Clause ... was '[v]irtually strangled in [its]
infancy by post-civil-war judicial reactionism' [and] was relegated to decades of relative desuetude,"
University of Calif. Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 291 (1978) (footnote omitted); for the seminal
discussion of equal protection theory see generally, Tussman & ten-Broek, The Equal Protection of
the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 341 (1949) [hereinafter Tussman & ten-Broek]. Since the Warren Court
began the revitalization of the Equal Protection Clause, the volume of scholarly writing addressed
to the equal protection doctrine has been enormous. The classic discussion is Gunther, Forward: In
Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court; A Model For a Newer Equal Protection, 86
HARV. L. REV. I (1972) [hereinafter Gunther, Newer Equal Protection].See also, Developments in
the Law of Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1065 (1969) [hereinafter Developments].
14. See generally, McCoy, Recent Equal ProtectionDecisions-Fundamental Right to Travel or
'Newcomers' as a Suspect Class?, 28 VAND. L. REV. 987 (1975); Perry, Modern Equal Protection:
A Conceptualization and Appraisal, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1023, 1075-77 (1979); Reinstein, The
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claims in general or at right to travel doctrine in particular. My concern
is that, irrespective of the characterization of the standard of review as
strict, semi-strict, heightened rationality or minimal, the Court has given
an unwarranted hyperprotected status to more recently arrived state residents by its unthinking condemnation of the political end of rewarding
the past service of citizens.
When the judicial branch of government addresses questions of the
constitutionality of the goals of the political branches, and condemns
those goals as illegitimate, it is engaging in a momentous exercise of its
power for which it should offer compelling reasons. All too often, however, the Burger Court's statements as to the legitimacy and worth of
legislative purposes were stated dogmatically.' 5 This lack of principled
guidance in distinguishing the legitimate from the illegitimate end is a
particularly troubling legacy since a finding of unconstitutionality based
on an illicit purpose may disable the government from acting altogether
on a given subject.' 6 Yet despite the extreme exercise of judicial power
that delegitimation of governmental ends entails, the Burger Court failed
to craft the instructive and enduring rationales that such an exercise
demands. 7
The most telling criticism, however, of this use of ends condemnation
in its equality jurisprudence is that the Burger Court in the guise of
rationality review has given heightened protection to newly arrived state
residents-a group that has no particular claim to judicial solicitude under
Welfare Cases: FundamentalRights, The Poor, and the Burden of Proofin Constitutional Litigation,
44 TEMP. L.Q. 1, 39 (1970); Note, Durational Residence Requirements from Shapiro through
Sosna: The Right to Travel Takes a New Turn, 50 N.Y.U. L. REV. 622 (1979); Note, The Supreme
Court-1973 Term, 88 HARV. L. REV. 41, 112-19 (1974); Comment, A Strict Scrutiny of the Right
to Travel, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1129 (1975).
15. The Court has characterized governmental ends inter alia as permissible, permissible but not
sufficiently important to justify the government's action, or impermissible. On occasion individual
justices have indicated that no purpose for an enactment appears. See, e.g., Schweiker v. Wilson,
450 U.S. 221 (1981) "Neither the structure [of the challenged Statute] nor its legislative history
identifies or even suggests any policy plausibly intended to be served by denying appellees the
[benefit at issue]." Id. at 245 (Powell, J., dissenting).
The Court has denoted a purpose itself as "rational" although closer examination reveals either
that "rational" in context means at least minimally acceptable, see, e.g., infra notes 209-11 and
accompanying text, or that the "means" are "sufficiently" related at an otherwise unobjectionable
purpose. See, e.g., infra, notes 96-100 and accompanying text. See also City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 452 (1985) (Stevens, J. concurring). "[Tihe word
'rational' ... includes elements of legitimacy and neutrality." Id. I define "rationality" as a test of
means-ends congruence.
16. See Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring).
17. A "subjective and varying interpretation of" a constitutional guarantee, see, e.g., Cleveland
Bd. of Ed. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 562-63 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) means that the
same cases will recur time after time, depending on the particular facts even though the Court speaks
in absolutes.
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the Court's established criteria. This hyperprotected status trivializes the
meaning of and necessity for a constitutional command of equal protection
against governmental acts that oppress or suppress the despised, rejected
or powerless. By condemning a purpose to reward citizens for past efforts
the Court in effect created a rule that classifications based on length of
residence or date of arrival in a state are invalid per se, thereby creating
a "suspicious" classification of a group whose members share little except
the happenstance of time of arrival in a new home. It is impossible to
reconcile this extraordinary protection with the lesser scrutiny the Court
employs in testing classifications based on sex, 18 illegitimacy,19 or alienage'
even though these traits have been used by hostile or thoughtless legislatures to justify disadvantageous treatment. Nor can this protection be
reconciled with the Court's lack of protection for those whose shared trait
18. See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (sex-based classification must be reasonable
and must bear a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation), arguably a more stringent
test than minimum rationality but clearly not strict scrutiny. See also Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S.
57 (1981); Michael M. v. Superior Ct., 450 U.S. 464 (1981); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975);
Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974). But see Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (Classifications
by sex must be substantially related to important governmental objectives); accord, Mississippi Univ.
for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 712 (1982). See also Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S 728 (1984)
(government has burden of showing and legitimate and exceeding persuasive justification for genderbased classification and of demonstrating direct, substantial relationship between means and end).
See generally Freedman, Sex Equality, Sex Differences and the Supreme Court, 92 YALE L.J. 913
(1983); Williams, The Equality Crisis: Some Reflections on Culture, Courts and Feminism, 7 WOMEN'S
RTs. L. REP. 175 (1985); Forward: Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV.
L. REV. 1 (1977); Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955 (1984).
19. For a suggestion that even minimum rationality review might not apply, see Labine v. Vincent,
401 U.S. 532 (1971) "Absent a specific constitutional guarantee, it is for that legislature, not the
life-tenured judges of this Court, to select from among possible laws." Id. at 538; see also Mathews
v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976) (distinctions based on illegitimacy do not require strici scrutiny even
though status resembles race or national origin in that it is beyond individual's control and is irrelevant
to ability to participate in and contribute to society and it is illogical and unjust to express disapproval
of parents behavior by condemning nonmarital child). For a discussion of the Court's uncertain and
inconsistent jurisprudence when confronting equal protection challenges to illegitimacy laws, see
H. KRAUSE, CHILD SUPPORT INAMERICA: THE LEGAL PERSPECTIVE at 103-62 (1981). See also Clark,
Constitutional Protection of the Illegitimate Child?, 12 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 383 (1979); Maltz,
Illegitimacy and Equal Protection, 1980 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 831; Stenoyer, The Supreme Court and
Illegitimacy: 1968-1977, II FAM. L. Q. 365 (1978); Note, Illegitimacy and Equal Protection, 49
N.Y.U. L. REV. 479 (1974).
20. The Court has taken a bifurcated approach to alienage classifications under which some are
suspect under an "economic function" approach. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365
(1971); accord In re Griftiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973); Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216 (1984); Cabell
v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432 (1982); Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977); Examining Bd. v.
Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572 (1976); Sugarman v. Dougal, 413 U.S. 634 (1973); and some receive
deferential review under a "political function" exception, see, e.g., Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S.
291 (1978); accord Amback v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979). For criticism of the Court's equal
protection analysis of alienage classifications and a suggestion that an unarticulated theory of preemption is at work, see Note, The Equal Treatment ofAliens: Preemption or Equal Protection? 31 STAN.
L. REV. 1069 (1979); see also Note, Student Burdens on ResidentAlien: A New Preemption Analysis,
89 YALE L.J. 940 (1980).
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is homosexual orientation, 2 ' developmental disability, 22 poverty 23 or advanced age.24 Again, there is a long history of mistreatment based on
fear, hatred or inexcusable ignorance. To the extent that condemning
classifications based on length of residency reflects a prophylaxis against
covert disadvantaging of racial, ethnic or religious minorities, it is too
broad a remedy. To the extent that it reflects a belief that newcomers
need and are entitled to protection from perceived hostility of "old timers,"
it ignores or distorts the reality of much of this country's history and
present day interstate migration. At worst it echos strains of eighteenth
and nineteenth century imperialism, encapsulated in the political slogan
"manifest destiny," with its belief in a God-given right to territorial
expansion of the American republic.25 It has often been noted that we are
the most ahistoric society on earth, a fact which enabled many among
21. The Court has not addressed the issue of equal protection for those with a homosexual
preference, but the overt homophobia of Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, reh'g denied, 478
U.S. 1039 (1986), a substantive due process decision, does not bode well for practicing homosexuals.
See generally Note, The Constitutional Status of Sexual Orientation: Homosexuality as a Suspect
Classification, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1285 (1985).
22. See, e.g.. City of Clebure v. Clebume Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (mentallyretarded not a quasi-suspect class for purposes of equal protection review). There the Court noted
that "[If the large and amorphous class of the mentally retarded were deemed quasi-suspect,it would
be difficult to find a principled way to distinguish other groups who have perhaps immutable
disabilities setting them off from others, who cannot themselves mandate the desired legislative
responses, and who can claim some degree of prejudice from at least part of the public at large.
One need mention in this respect only the aging, the disabled, the mentally ill, and the infirm. We
are reluctant to set out on that course, and we decline to do so." Id. at 445-46.
23. James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971) (law making procedure that disadvantages a particular
group does not always deny equal protection); San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411
U.S. 1 (1973) (rationality standard of review for school financing system challenged as discriminating
against children of poor families residing in districts with low property tax base); but see Harper v.
Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) ("Lines drawn on the basis of wealth or property
. . . are traditionally disfavored.") Id. at 668 (citations omitted).
24. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976). "[O]ld age does not define
a 'discrete and insular' group in need of 'extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political
process."' Id. at 313 (citing United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n. 4
(1938)); see also Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93 (1979).
25. In 1845 a New York City editor wrote exuberantly that it was America's "'manifest destiny
to overspread and to possess the whole of the continent which Providence has given us for the
development of the great experiment of liberty and federated self-government entrusted to us.' This
doctrine, . . .quickly taken up by press and politicians, was in part the kind of rationalization that
expansionists everywhere have used to justify territorial aggrandizement. They invariably celebrate
the superiority of their culture and insist that their conquests are merely the fulfillment of a divine
mission impelled by forces beyond human control. So did Americans when they spoke of their
Manifest Destiny. " J. BLUM, E. MORGAN, W. ROSE, A. SCHLESINGER, K. STAMP & C. VANN WOODWARD,
THE NATIONAL EXPERIENCE: A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES TO 1877, at 256 (4th ed. 1977)
[hereinafter J. BLUM]. See also E. MAY, IMPERIAL DEMOCRACY, (1961); F. MERK, MANIFEST DESTINY
AND MISSION IN AMERICAN HISTORY: A REINTERPRETATION (1963); A. WEINBERG, MANIFEST DESTINY
(1935). For a discussion of the rebirth of the spirit of manifest destiny in the 1890's see S. MORRISON,
H. COMMAGER, & W. LEUCHTENBURG, THE GROWTH OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, vol. 11, 244-61
(1980) [hereinafter S. MORRISON].
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us to convince themselves that the United States of America had (and
still has) a foredained destiny which necessitates its continued expansion. 6 Some believed it was our mission to bring republicanism to the
unenlightened, 27 others Christian salvation to the damned 2' and others
found reason enough in the quest for economic markets. 29 Whatever the
particular justification, territorial expansion has been the means to the
end of fulfilling America's "destiny." 3" Clearly the Supreme Court cannot
alter the fait accompli of the republic's expansion, but it does not follow
that the constitution forbids a state's rewarding the past efforts of its
citizens.
At the outset it should be noted that the Burger Court's willingness to
invalidate a legislative act because of its animating purpose was not a
break with precedent. 3' The Burger Court, however, in its condemnation
of this governmental end in the name of equality went beyondtraditionally
26. "Why did the conviction of the corruptibility of men and the vulnerability of states-and the
consequent idea of America as experiment-give way to the delusion of a saved mission and a
sanctified destiny? The intense historical-mindedness of the founding fathers did not endure." A.
SCHLESINGER, THE CYCLES OF HISTORY at 16 (1986) [hereinafter A. SCHLESINGER]. For a discussion
of the theories and literature on imperialism, particularly American, see id. at 118-62. For a recent
article exploring the ideological implications of the national policy decisions necessary "to organize,
distribute and defend" an expanding territory see generally Onuf, Liberty, Development, and Union:
Visions of the West in the 1780's, WM. AND MARY Q. 179 (1987).
27. For a discussion of the growth of the theory of America as an "elect" nation see A. SCHLESINGER, supra note 26, at 16-22.
28. Id. at 19.
29. See generally J.BLUM supra note 25, at 256; see also A. SCHLESINGER supra note 26 at 12026.
30. "The United States has been an expansionist country. In the two centuries since the adoption
of the constitution the national area has more than quadrupled." A. SCHLESINGER, supra note 26, at
128.
31. That governments of our federal system are constitutionally prohibited from pursuing certain
objectives is a given of venerable origin in our constitutional jurisprudence. See, e.g., Thayer, The
Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129 (1883).
See also Chief Justice Marshall's oft-quoted test of congressional power in McCulloch v. Maryland,
17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316, 421 (1819) "Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the
constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are
not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional." Even the
most deferential scrutiny of governmental action requires that it be rationally related to the accomplishment of a "permissible" policy. "If the laws passed are seen to have a reasonable relation to
a proper legislative purpose, and are neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, the requirements of due
process are satisfied." Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537 (1934) (emphasis added). Neither
executives nor the judiciary can seek' to accomplish unconstitutional purposes any more than can
legislators or rule making authorities. See, e.g., Mayor of Philadelphia v. Education Equality League,
415 U.S. 605 (1974) (mayor's selection of nominating panel for school board on which black persons
were statistically underrepresented upheld in absence of proof of discrimination beyond statistical
impact). See also Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958) (extreme public hostility to school authorities'
desegregation plan engendered by actions of Governor and Legislature seeking to maintain segregated
schools not a basis for granting additional time to comply with desegregation ruling); Swain v.
Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965) (prosecutors' challenge to potential jurors solely on account of their
race forbidden by equal protection).
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heightened protection of fundamental rights or of the recognized suspect
classifications into new and unchartered realms for reasons that are largely
unclear. To the extent that the reasons are clear, they distort the meaning
of the doctrines upon which they appear to rely.
Before addressing the three specific cases at which this critique is
directed, a reacquaintance with three of their most immediate antecedents,
32 , Shapiro v. Thompson33 and
Edwards v. California
Department of Ag34
riculture v. Moreno illuminates the changing ideological as well as
constitutional concerns which have always informed the Supreme Court's
jurisprudence on the proper ends of government and demonstrates the
major and unwarranted shift in emphasis that the recent trio represents.
II. IMMEDIATE ANTECEDENTS
A. Equality and Federalism:Edwards v. Californiaand Shapiro v.
Thompson
In order to understand the concepts inherent in the Burger Court's
condemnation of legislative purpose in Zobel, Hooper, and Soto-Lopez,
a re-examination of the origins and progeny of Shapiro v. Thompson,35
is instructive. Shapiro was a last minute legacy of the Warren Court in
which the Court branded not one but three legislative purposes illegitimate
as it struck down durational residency requirements for recipients of public
assistance as violative of a right to travel protected by the equal protection
requirements of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
One of Shapiro's most important antecedents is a seminal 1941 commerce clause case, Edwards v. California,' the various opinions in which,
although eschewing reliance on the Equal Protection Clause, sowed the
seeds for the Warren and Burger Court's protection of a substantive right
to travel as a function of equal protection. 37 The case was occasioned by
the dust bowl migrations of destitute "poor white" tenants and share32. 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
33. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
34. 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
35. 394 U.S. 618 (1969). The antecedents of legitimacy of purpose, however, which were developed in these decisions subsumed under the rubric of the "right to travel" or the right of interstate
migration, present an amalgam of doctrines from the Court's jurisprudence on equality and federalism
as developed under the Equal Protection, Commerce and Article IV Privileges and Immunities
Clauses. See, e.g., id., supra note 10.
36. 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
37. This is not to suggest Edwards provided the only conceptual basis, see supra, note 10, but
that any analysis of durational residence requirements and freedom of movement must begin with
Edwards. See, e.g., Harvith, The Constitutionality of Residence Tests for General and Categorical
Assistance Programs, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 567, 580 (1966) [hereinafter Harvith, Residence Tests].
See also J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST, 177-79 (1980) for a discussion of the Court's refusal
to provide a constitutional source of the right to relocate.

Spring 19891

MORE EQUAL THAN OTHERS

croppers from Arkansas, Mississippi, Oklahoma and Texas who came to
California in record numbers to seek work in its more fertile fields38 or,
frequently, to utilize California's markedly higher standard of social services. 39 Mr. Edwards had run afoul of the law by driving his unemployed
and destitute brother-in-law from Texas to settle in California which led
to Edward's conviction under a statute which made it a misdemeanor for
anyone to bring or assist in bringing into the state a nonresident known
to be indigent.' In holding that penalizing the transportation of nonresident indigent persons into the state placed an unconstitutional burden on
interstate commerce, the majority rejected the state's argument that paupers constituted a "moral pestilence" and indicated that it is no longer
within the competence of a state to fence out indigents from sister states.4'
The words "no longer" were necessary because in 1837 in City of New
York v. Miln,4 2 the Court had upheld New York's requirement of a report
of the names, ages and last legal settlement of its passengers imposed
upon the master of every vessel arriving in order "to prevent them from
becoming chargeable as paupers," 43 stating that New York had the competence to pass a law whose object was "to prevent New York from being
burdened by an influx of persons . ..either from foreign countries, or
from any other of the states."' The Miln Court saw the act in question,
not as a "regulation of commerce," but as a regulation of "internal
police," justified by a "moral health" rationale.45
The Miln Court had also opined that it was "the duty of the state to
protect its citizens from this evil." ' What then was the basis for the
condemnation in 1941 of a legislative purpose that had been not only
valid in 1837 but also spoken of as a duty? In Edwards, Justice Byrnes
distinguished Miln and the cases repeating its language by noting that
"[in none of these cases. . . was the power of a State to exclude 'paupers'
actually involved." 47 He also indicated that the Court did not consider
itself bound by the language of Miln, rejecting the moral pestilence ra38. Edwards, 314 U.S. at 167.
39. Id. (arguments for appellee State of California).
40. Id. at 170-71.
41. Id. at 176-77.
42. 36 U.S. (II Pet.) 102 (1834).
43. Id. at 132.
44. Id. The federal government still excludes aliens who are paupers, professional beggars or
vagrants, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (8) or those who are likely to become public charges. Id. at § 1182(a)
(15).
45. Miln, 36 U.S. (I I Pet.) at 132.
46. Id. The Court thought it "competent and as necessary for a state to provide precautionary
measures against the moral pestilence of paupers, vagabonds, and possibly convicts; as it is to guard
against physical pestilence, which may arise from unsound and infectious articles imported, or from
a ship, the crew of which may be labouring under an infectious disease." Id. at 142-43.
47. 314 U.S. at 177.
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tionale on the basis of change in prevailing notions,48 concluding that
"[p]overty and immorality are not synonymous." 4 9
The majority opinion in Edwards was clearly grounded in the Court's
view of the nature of our federal union as expressed in the Commerce
Clause. California could not seek to isolate itself from the difficulties
common to all of the states "by restraining the transportation of persons
and property across its borders." 5 0 Justice Byrne also noted that "indigent
non-residents . . . are deprived of the opportunity to exert political pressure upon the California legislature in order to obtain a change in policy,"" a clear reliance on the "political restraint" theory which informs
so much of the Court's dormant commerce clause jurisprudence condemning protectionist or discriminatory economic legislation.52 The majority also relied upon dormant commerce clause doctrine in rejecting
California's argument that care of the indigent is solely a local responsibility rather a national concern.5 3
The concurring opinions of Justices Douglas and Jackson merit note
because their eschewal of commerce clause analysis and the reemergence
of their theories in Zobe 4 forty-three years later, although in altered form
and arising from a factual setting that bears no discernible relationship
to the compelling circumstances against which Edwards was decided.
Justice Douglas spoke of "the right of persons to move freely from State
to State" 55 as fundamental, a position which would capture a majority in
Shapiro v. Thompson. He, however, viewed the right as "an incident of
national citizenship protected by the privileges and immunities clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment against state interference," a preconstitutional
right fundamental to the character of the national government.56 He did
not view the statute in issue as involving discrimination by one state
"against citizens of other States in favor of its own"; 57 therefore, the
Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause did not pertain.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 173.
51. Id. at 174 (citing South Carolina v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177 (1938) in which Justice
Stone in discussing the Commerce Clause's ban on discrimination against interstate commerce stated
that "when the regulation is of such a character that its burden falls principally upon those without
the state, legislative action is not likely to be subjected to those political restraints which are normally
exerted on legislation where it adversely affects some interests within the state"). Id. at 185 n.2
(citation omitted). See also Raymond Motor Transp. Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 444 n. 18 (1978).
52. See also Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 726 (1945); United Bldg. & Constr. Trades
Council v. Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 223 (1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
53. Edwards, 314 U.S. at 173-74.
54. See infra notes 236-5 i and accompanying text.
55. Edwards, 314 U.S. at 177.
56. Id. at 178 (emphasis in original).
57. Id. at 181 (citing Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496, 511 (1939) (citatiotns omitted)).
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Because Justice Douglas grounded his concurrence in a national right
of free movement from state to state, he addressed the legitimacy of
purpose issue obliquely. He noted that to allow curtailment based on
poverty would be to undermine national unity and to "introduce a caste
system utterly incompatible with the spirit of our system of government." 58 Justice Douglas' later opinions would clearly establish that he
regarded poverty as an insupportable basis for harmful classifications, a
fact adumbrated in Edwards." There he condemned the relegation of the
poor to second class national citizenship as an impairment of equality
principles.'
Justice Jackson also relied upon rights of national citizenship protected
against state abridgement by the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges and
Immunities Clause. 6' Justice Jackson agreed that principles of national
citizenship were the proper source of decision, but grounded those rights
not in our federal structure but in the specific language of the Fourteenth
Amendment's citizenship clause, which creates rights of national citizenship protected against state abridgement by that amendments' privileges and immunities clause.6 2 He wrote movingly when he reached what
he regarded as the crux of the case-was indigence a valid reason to
restrict the free movement of a citizen as were "crime or contagion"? 6 3
His answer was unequivocal. "'Indigence' in itself is neither a source of
rights nor a basis for denying them. The mere state of being without
funds is a neutral fact-constitutionally an irrelevance, like race, creed
or color." '6 Justice Jackson's humane concern for the ability of the
wretchedly poor citizens of one state to seek a better life in another state,
however, was coupled with a less salutary rationale in his statement that
subjecting choice of residence "to local approval" contravened "the inescapable implications of the westward movement of our civilization. "65
The condemnation of legislative purpose in Edwards reemerged in
altered form in 1969. In Shapiro v. Thompson,' the Court invalidated
state imposed durational residency requirements for welfare assistance as
a denial of equal protection because the interests allegedly served by the
classification of needy families into old and new residents either could

58. Edwards, 314 U.S. at 181.
59. See, e.g., his opinions for the court in Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) and Harper
v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
60. Edwards, 314 U.S. at 181.
61. Id. at 183 (Jackson, J., concurring).
62. Id. at 183-84.
63. Id. at 184.
64. Id. at 184-85.
65. Id. at 183.
66. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
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not be promoted by government or were not "compelling" state interests.67
The Court held that "the purpose of inhibiting migration by needy persons
into the State is constitutionally impermissible." 68 The rationale for this
branch of the holding was grounded in a right to travel interstate. Although
Justice Brennan in his majority opinion declined then as now "to ascribe
the source of [the] right to travel interstate to [any] particular constitutional
provision," 6 9 he drew on an amalgam of federalism concepts,7" the Article
IV and Fourteenth Amendment Privileges and Immunities Clause,7 the
Commerce Clause72 and "our . . . concepts of personal liberty." 73 Because the right to travel from state to state was so firmly established a
"basic right," 74 the purpose of deterring in-migration of indigents was
unavailable as a justification for the classification since that purpose was
constitutionally impermissible. Justice Brennan analogized this purpose
to a bare purpose to "chill the assertion of constitutional rights by penalizing those who choose to exercise them" ;75 a purpose that is "patently
unconstitutional. ,76
The Shapiro majority also invalidated a state purpose "to discourage
those indigents who would enter the state solely to obtain larger benefits,", 7 7 on the theory that any such distinction between classes of migrating
indigents implied that those seeking higher welfare benefits were less
67. The Court conceded the validity of state objectives to: (I) facilitate the planning of the welfare
budget, (2) provide an objective test of residence, (3) minimize the opportunity for recipients
fraudulently to obtain payments from more than jurisdiction, and (4) encourage early entry into the
work force, but required a compelling state interest because the waiting period penalized the exercise
of a constitutional fight. Id. at 634.
68. Id. at 629.
69. Id. at 630.
70. "This Court long ago recognized that the nature of our Federal Union and our constitutional
concepts of personal liberty unite to require that all citizens be free to travel throughout ...the
land uninhibited by statutes, rules, or regulations which unreasonably burden or restrict this movement." Id. at 629.
71. Id. at 630 n.8.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 629.
74. Id. at 630 (citing United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757-58 (1966)).
75. Id. at 631 (citing United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 581 (1968) in which the Court
invalidated a federal criminal statute's death penalty clause's selective procedure which had the
effect of making defendants "risk death" if asserting their right to a jury trial). For Supreme Court
decisions invalidating unconstitutional conditions attached to otherwise valid exercises of legislative
authority, see N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (state 'doing business' statute requiring
lists of all members of NAACP impedes freedom of association absent showing of compelling
interest); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952) (loyalty oath that does not require government
employee know purpose of proscribed organization violates due process); see generally O'Neill,
UnconstitutionalConditions: Welfare Benefits With Strings Attached, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 443 (1966);
Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, 74 YALE L.J. 1245 (1965).
Note, Unconstitutional Conditions, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1595 (1960).
76. Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 631.
77. Id..
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deserving-an untenable notion."8 The majority also invalidated a purpose
to distinguish between old and new residents based on past contributions
through the payment of taxes.79 The Court questioned the factual predicate
of such a purpose, but concluded that irrespective of the facts of the case,
the consequences of recognizing such a purpose necessitated its invalidation-that is, that the state could "apportion all benefits and services
8
according to the past tax contributions of citizens." The Court stated
that "[t]he Equal Protection Clause prohibits such an apportionment of
state services"'" but it offered no further rationale.
A concern with poverty as a classifying factor seems to underlie this
holding, given the importance of welfare and other public benefits to
their recipients. Shapiro was, after all, decided in the aftermath of a
82
number of cases involving equal access to the criminal appeals process
3 that had spoken of the "special scrutiny" which wealth
and voting rights
84
based classifications provoked. Until 1970 when Dandridgev. Williams
ended any hope that discriminatory welfare legislation would receive
elevated scrutiny, it was widely assumed that the Court had (1) recognized
the poor as a suspect class 5 and (2) constitutionalized a "right to minimum
subsistence." 86 The Shapiro Court arguably meant that a purpose to with78. Id. at 631-32. The Court also found the classification overinclusive for that purpose; therefore,
it created an irrebuttable presumption that every applicant for assistance in his first year of residence
came into the jurisdiction solely to obtain higher benefits. Id. at 631.
79. Id. at 632.
80. Id. at 632-33.
81. Id. at 633.
82. See, e.g., Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
See also Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U.S. 40 (1967) ("Our decisions for more than a decade now have
made clear that differences in access to the instruments needed to vindicate legal rights, when based
upon the financial situation of the defendant are repugnant to the constitution"). Id. at 42.
83. See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
84. 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (in the area of economics and social welfare, an imperfect classification
resulting in disparity of payments to largest AFDC families does not require heightened scrutiny);
accord Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972) (rationality review for grant of lower percentage
of need to AFDC recipients than recipients of other categorical assistance programs); Richardson v.
Belcher, 404 U.S. 78 (1971) (rationality review for disparities in disability benefits). For a defense
of minimum rationality review for welfare legislation see Wilkinson, The Supreme Court, The Equal
Protection Clause and the Three Faces of Constitutional Equalization, 61 VA. L. REV. 945, 1010
(1975). "[I]n voiding public welfare classifications, courts engage in . . . the most basic of all
legislative functions-from whom and to whom to raise and distribute revenue." See also Freund,
The Judicial Process in Civil Liberties Cases, 1975 U. ILL. L. F. 493, 494.
85. See, e.g., Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) ("[W]here the merits of the one and
only appeal an indigent has of right are decided without benefit of counsel, . . . an unconstitutional
line has been drawn between rich and poor"). Id. at 357 (emphasis in original); Griffin v. Illinois,
351 U.S. 12 (1952) (state must provide trial transcript to indigent criminal defendants).
86. "Lines drawn on the basis of wealth or poverty, like those of race, are traditionally disfavored."
Harper v. Virginia, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966) (poll tax as a precondition of voting denies equal
protection to the indigent); see also Chief Justice Warren's dictum that "a careful examination on
our part is especially warranted where lines are drawn on the basis of wealth or race . . . two factors
which independently render a classification highly suspect and thereby demand a more exacting
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hold welfare benefits from those who had not been taxpayers led to an
"irrational classification," ' 87 although clearly equality is what is involved
rather than "rationality." The Court did recognize a valid state interest
in the fiscal integrity of its programs albeit one that was not sufficiently
important in the circumstances to validate the classification. 88 The extent
to which a government may rely upon that interest in the face of competing
interests such as interstate mobility89 or access to education' has never
been definitively resolved."

Chief Justice Warren dissented on the ground that Congress had the
power, pursuant to the Commerce Clause, to impose residency requirements and could authorize (and had authorized) the states to do so, even
though the states acting alone might not have been constitutionally able
to do so. 92 His discussion of "the illegitimate purpose of keeping poor
judicial scrutiny." McDonald v. Board of Elec., 394 U.S. 802, 807 (1969) (emphasis added). This
is not to suggest that commentators agreed that de facto wealth classifications were constitutionally
suspicious, see, e.g., Michelman, Foreward: Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7, 27 (1969) (de facto pecuniary classification "typically carries a highly
persuasive justification"). See also Winter, Poverty, Economic Equality and the Equal Protection
Clause, 1972 SUP. CT. REV. 41; Bork, The Impossibility of Finding Welfare Rights in the Constitution,
1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 695; Clune, The Supreme Court's Treatment of Wealth Discrimination Under
the Fourteenth Amendment, 1975 SUP.CT. REV. 289.
87. The Court observed that none of the statutes had been "tailored to serve that objective."
Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 631.
88. The Court stated that the government "must do more than show that denying welfare benefits
to new residents saves money," id. at 633, and noted that reduction in welfare costs "cannot justify
an otherwise invidious classification." Id. There is nothing irrational, however, in the scheme
proposed. It may have been unfair, but there is a clear means-end congruence.
89. For example, in striking Georgia's durational residency for abortions, under Article IV's
Privileges and Immunity Clause, the Court indicated that Georgia had not alleged that it had a
scarcity of medical resources that necessitated withholding services from the newly arrived. Doe v.
Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
90. See, e.g., Stains v. Maklerson, 326 F. Supp. 234, (D. Minn. 1970), affd, 401 U.S. 985
(197 1) (Minnesota's one year residency requirement for in-state university tuition benefits upheld);
but see, Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973) (Connecticut's irrebuttable presumption that out-ofstate students could not qualify for in-state tuition violates procedural due process); cf., Martinez v.
Bynum, 461 U.S. 321 (1973) (bona fide residence requirement for minors attending free public
school valid as rationally related to "the substantial state interest in assuring that services provided
for its residents are enjoyed only by residents"). Id. at 328.
91. Justice Stewart, who in a brief concurrence, grounded the right to travel interstate in something
"independent of the fourteenth amendment"-arguably in considerations of the meaning of national
citizenship, Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 643, (Stewart, I., dissenting),-stressed that the Court was simply
recognizing "an established constitutional right" that is "virtually unconditional." Id. Therefore,
the purpose of deterring the in-migration of indigents was constitutionally impermissible. Id.
92. Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 644 (Warren, C.I., dissenting). His reasoning raises the question of
whether Congress acting pursuant to its power to override Supreme Court commerce clause decisions
may immunize the states from successful challenges based on other constitutional provisions, a
question which, although related to the issues under discussion is beyond the scope of this Article.
For an affirmative answer see Cohen, Congressional Power to Validate Unconstitutional State Laws:
A Forgotten Solution to an Old Enigma, 35 STAN. L. REV. 387 (1983) and Cohen, Federalism in
Equality Clothing: A Comment on Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v. Ward, 38 STAN. L. REV.
1 (1985).
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people from migrating" 93 was limited to two conclusions: (1)such a
purpose was not supported by the legislative history94 and (2) the Court
was forbidden from inquiring into legislative motives.9"
Justice Harlan's dissent is worth noting since he recognized a constitutional right to travel, located in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment, 96 but concluded that no impermissible justifications had been
advanced in support of the residency requirements. Denying benefits to
those who had recently moved into the jurisdiction solely to collect higher
benefits was permissible because the legislature had made a "rational"
choice as to who was more deserving of subsidy.97 Justice Harlan appears
to have meant by this that it is permissible for a legislature to pick and
choose upon those eligible for public assistance on the basis of its sense
of relative merit (not necessarily need). Once that argument is accepted,
it is difficult to disagree that such a method (or for that matter, any method
of disqualification) makes more funds available for those "more worthy
of subsidy." 98 However, Justice Harlan's citation to that portion of Professor Bernard Harvith's seminal article on the constitutionality of residency requirements for welfare, which contains an economic analysis of
the savings in welfare costs made possible by disqualifying recent arrivals'
leads to the conclusion that Justice Harlan was really talking about choice
of means, i.e., discrimination among classes of needy, rather than ends,
since reduction of welfare costs is the purpose supported by his argument.
Ultimately, this is nothing more than standard "social and economic"
legislation rationality review which permits very imperfect classifications.
Clearly in Justice Harlan's view desire for higher benefits was not a
constitutional irrelevancy.
Justice Harlan also was of the view that a legislature could legitimately
act in order "to restrict welfare payments financed in part by state tax
funds to persons who have recently made some contribution to the State's
economy, through having been employed, having paid taxes, or having
spent money in the state."' Clearly, the constitutionality vel non of
93. Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 651.
94. Id. at 644-47.
95. Id. at 651 (citing Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423, 455 (1931)).
96. Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 671 (Harlan, J. dissenting).
97. Id. at 672.
98. Id.
99. "A fair conclusion seems to be that, at least in some states, it is not unreasonable for the
legislature to conclude that a useful saving in welfare costs may be obtained by residence tests
discouraging those who would enter the state solely because of its welfare programs. In New York,
for example, a one percent savings in welfare costs would amount to several million dollars." Id.
at 672 n.32 (citing Harvith, Residence Tests, supra note 37, at 618). It should be noted that the
article provided a conceptual framework for an attack on durational residency tests for categorical
assistance and concluded that both state and federal tests clearly infringed on protected interests.
100. Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 673-74. •
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"recognition of past contributions" is one, which divided the Warren
Court in Shapiro and would also plague the Burger Court.' 0
In Shapiro, Justice Brennan indicated that not all durational residency
requirements would have to be justified by a compelling state interest,
noting that the Court implied no view of the constitutionality of either
waiting period or residence requirement for voting, professional or hunting or fishing licenses, tuition-free education "and so forth"'° 2-thus
leaving very unclear the extent to which a state may seek to protect its
economic resources against claims of out-of-staters and of newly arrived
residents. ,03
The Burger Court's first important decision involving the "fundamental" right to travel, Dunn v. Blumstein, " held that Tennessee could not
impose a one year residency period as a precondition of the franchise
without demonstrating that a compelling interest necessitated such a lengthy
waiting period.' °5 In Dunn, the right to vote, which the Warren Court
had also denominated as fundamental,'" was implicated as well as the
right to travel. The next year, however, the Burger Court made clear in
Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County °7 if Shapiro had not, that a durational residency requirement could run afoul of the right to travel even
if no other fundamental right was involved. There the issue was the
101. See infra notes 204-13 and accompanying text.
102. 394 U.S. at 638 n.21.
103. Other constitutional concerns come into play. See generally Sunstein, Naked Preferences,
supra note 2. See, e.g.. Varat, State Citizenship and Interstate Equality, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 487
(1981) for a discussion of the equality principles of Article IV's Privileges and Immunities Clause
and of the Commerce Clause. "The prime area of uncertainty is the distribution of the public
resources, opportunities, and benefits from each state." Id. at 491. For a discussion of the claims
of out-of-staters to natural resources in particular, see generally Hellerstein, Hughes v. Oklahoma:
The Court, The Commerce Clause and State Control of Natural Resources, 1979 SuP.CT. REV. 51;
cf. Baldwin v. Montana Fish and Game Commn., 436 U.S. 371 (1978); but see Hicklin v. Orbeck,
437 U.S. 518 (1978). For a perplexing recent decision upholding legislation which discriminated
against out of state interests on its face, see Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986); cf. Sporhase v.
Nebraska 458 U.S. 941 (1982); New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331 (1982);
Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979); Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 645 (1978);
McCarthy v. Philadelphia Civil Serv. Comm'n., 424 U.S. 654 (1976).
104. 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
105. Id. at 342, 360. The Court made plain that travel need not actually have been deterred. Id.
at 339. The Court indicated that an evenhanded requirement would not be considered a penalty or
subjected to strict scrutiny. Id. at n.n. 12-13, but was not convinced that length of residency is
synonymous with knowledge of election issues. Id. at 354-60.
106. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966). Accord Kramer v. Union Free
School Dist. No. 15,395 U.S. 621 (1969). See also Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886)
(voting is a "fundamental political right, because preservative of all rights").
107. 415 U.S. 250 (1974). "Not unlike the admonition of the Bible that, 'Ye shall have one
manner of law, as well for the stranger, as for one of your own country,' Leviticus 24:22 (King
James Version), the right of interstate travel must be seen as insuring new residents the same right
to vital government benefits and privileges in the States to which they migrate as are enjoyed by
other residents." Id. at 261.
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constitutionality of a one year residency requirement for eligibility for
non-emergency public medical care. Justice Marshall's opinion for the
majority stressed the importance of medical care to the indigent from
another state, equating it with another "basic necessity of life"-welfare
assistance' °8 and made plain once again that the Court would use a penalty
analysis to determine whether a given waiting period constituted a penalty
on interstate migration that invoked strict scrutiny. " The gravity of the
harm and importance of the interest denied to the affected individuals
determined whether a penalty was involved. Again the Court noted that
not all durational residency requirements for government benefits would
be subjected to exacting scrutiny; only those which burdened benefits
essential to daily subsistence would be so examined. "0 Unfortunately,
the Court did not shed light on just what distinguishes a "penalty" from
"a bona fide residency requirement."
The next year, in 1975, the Court upheld Iowa's one year residency
requirement for a divorce action against a non-resident in Sosna v. Iowa. "
Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion eschewed penalty analysis and distinguished Shapiro, Dunn and Maricopa on the specious ground that the
would-be divorce plaintiff "was not irretrievably foreclosed from obtaining some part of what she sought."" He also noted that serious social
consequences may follow from the conferral of a divorce" 3 and the state's
interest in avoiding its use as a "divorce mill."'" With the exception of

Justice Marshall's dissenting opinion," 5 the Court's treatment of the significant personal effects which a delay of a year or more entails for one
who wants or needs to be free of the claims of an unwanted spouse was
cavalier in the extreme. The reality of the law of marriage in most states
in 1975 was that a wife who fled to a new jurisdiction to avoid a husband

108. Id. at 254 (citing Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. at 618).
109. Maricopa, 415 U.S. at 263.
110. Id. at 258-59 (citing Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 638 n.21).
1!1.419 U.S. 393 (1975).
112. Id. at 406. Justice Marshall noted that this justification for the statute ignored "the severity
of the deprivation suffered by the divorce petitioner who is forced to wait a year for relief," id. at
421, and that "[Tlhe right of marital association is one of the most basic rights conferred on the
individual by the State." Id. at 419 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
113. Sosna, 419 U.S. at 406. As Marshall pointed out, the importance of divorce militates against
a waiting period. Id. at 419.
114. Id. at 421. Fora suggestion that the peculiarities of divorce jurisdiction explain the distinction
between Sosna and other right to travel cases, see Note, A Strict Scrutiny of the Right to Travel, 22
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1129, 1157-58 (1975). See also Cook v. Cook, 342 U.S. 126 (1951); Johnson
v. Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581 (1951); Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948); Williams v. North
Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945). For a discussion of the doctrinal confusion compounded by Sosna,
see Note, DurationalResidency Requirements from Shapiro Through Sosna: The Right to Travel
Takes a New Turn, 50 N.Y.U.L. REV. 622, 656-67 (1975).
115. Sosna, 419 U.S. at 418-27.
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who assaulted," 6 or raped" 7 her would have no legal protection so long
as she was still married, even though separated." 8 Nor could a husband
necessarily avoid liability for the debts of a spendthrift wife, even one
who had substantial wealth'' or, in the rarer case, avoid an assaultive
one. 20
' The scholarly commentary on Sosna, however, has been primarily
concerned with issues of the proper analytic framework for judicial evaluation of right to travel claims."'2 Justice Marshall suggested what clearly
seems to be the case: the Court was engaged in ad hoc balancing.' 22
Certainly the scrutiny, however defined, was perfunctory. Sosna seemed
to signify, therefore, that if the enjoyment of a right was merely postponed, and the postponement would not result in destitution, untreated
medical needs or loss of an independent right such as the right to vote,
then durational residency requirements for a share of the public largess
would receive fairly toothless judicial scrutiny, a limitation which remained until Zobel v. Williams'23 in 1982.
B. Equality and Hostility Against the "Unpopular": Department of
Agriculture v. Moreno
In 1973, the Burger Court in Dept. ofAgriculture v. Moreno 4 upheld
116. See Note, The Battered Wife's Dilemma: To Kill or To Be Killed. 32 HASTINGS L.J. 895,
897-911 (1981). See also United States Attorney General's Task Force on Domestic Violence, 2224 (1984) noting that law enforcement officers have followed an avoidance policy based on incorrect
social science assumptions and State ex rel. Williams v. Marsh, 626 S.W.2d 223, 226 n.3 (Mo.
1982) (en banc) noting that although there has been a nationwide trend to legislate in the area of
domestic violence, "the statutes vary greatly in their provisions; some are available only if a
dissolution proceeding is pending." Id.
117. See People v. Liberta, 64 N.Y.2d 152, 474 N.E.2d 567, 485 N.Y.S.2d 207 (1984) (New
York rape law violates equal protection because the statute did not apply to marital rape); but see
MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES, PART 11,277 (1980) (marital rape less traumatic than
stranger rape). See generally Marcus, Conjugal Violence: The Law of Force and the Force of Law,
69 CAL. L. REV. 1657 (1981).
118. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.00(4) (McKinney 1977).
119. See, e.g., Schilling v. Bedford County Memorial Hosp., 225 Va. 539, 303 S.E.2d 905
(1983), overturning the common law necessaries doctrine as an unconstitutional gender-based classification. The common law rule imposing liability on a husband for his wife's necessaries was not
altered by Married Woman's Property Acts. See, e.g., Jersey Shore Medical Center v. Estate of
Baum, 84 N.J. 137, 417 A.2d 1003 (1980). (Orr v. Orr, 460 U.S. 268 (1978) requires modification
of the common law rule imposing obligation on husband but not on wife to achieve a fairer distribution
of the cost of necessaries).
120. See United States Attorney General's Task Force, supra note 116.
121. See, e.g., Note, DurationalResidence Requirements, supra note 114.
122. Sosna, 419 U.S. at 420 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See also Clark, Legislation Motivation
and FundamentalRights in ConstitutionalLaw, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 953, 987 (1978) ("Unlike
indigents seeking welfare benefits, divorce plaintiffs hardly constitute a class of persons the state
has any invidious reason for excluding. In the absence of any reason to suspect the state legislature
of invidious motives, strict judicial scrutiny of the law's constitutionality does not seem warranted").
Id.
123. 457 U.S. 55 (1982).
124. 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
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a Fifth Amendment due process challenge to a Congressional definition
of household in an amendment to the Food Stamp Act of 1964 which
was designed to exclude "hippie communes" from benefits. The stated
purposes of the Food Stamp Act were "to safeguard the health and wellbeing of the Nation's population . . . [to] raise levels of nutrition among
low-income households ... [t]o alleviate . . . hunger" and to bolster
the agricultural economy.' 25 Eligibility for participation was determined
on a "household" basis,' 26 with "household" originally defined as a
"group of related or non-related individuals"' 2 7 (other than institutional
or boarding house residents) who lived as an economic unit, sharing in
the purchase and preparation of food. In 1971, Congress redefined
"household" so as to exclude from eligibility any household containing
even one unrelated member unless the non-related individuals were over
sixty, ' an exception apparently based on a misperception that anyone
over sixty shared the sponsors' antipathy to "hippie" communes and the
values inherent therein. The effect of the amendment was to exclude from
the program groups of unrelated individuals, many of whom lived together
out of economic necessity, who satisfied the income eligibility requirements for assistance. 2' 9 The Court purported to apply minimum rationality
but found the classification irrelevant to the Act's stated purposes. The
relationships among members of a household are not determinative of
their nutritional needs or of their abilities to bolster the agricultural economy. 3 Since the stated purposes were not served by the challenged
classification, the Court had to look elsewhere for "a legitimate governmental interest. "'"' The government's assertion that the challenged classification served its legitimate interest in minimizing fraud was rejected
by the Court since a "denial of essential federal food assistance to all
otherwise eligible households containing unrelated members"' 32 was not
a "rational way" to deal with concerns about fraud. Such legislative
history as did exist indicated a congressional purpose to "prevent socalled 'hippies' and 'hippie communes' from participating in the program."' 33 In light of this purpose, Justice Brennan stated that, "if the
constitutional conception of 'equal protection of the laws' means anything,
125. Id. at 533.
126. Id. at 529.
127. Id. at 530 (emphasis deleted from the original).
128. Id. at 530 nn. 2-3.
129. Id. at 531.
130. Id. at 540 (quoting Moreno v. United States Dept. of Agriculture, 345 F. Supp. 310, 313
(1972)).
131. Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534 (emphasis deleted from the original).
132. Id. at 535-36 (emphasis in original).
133. Id. at 534 (citing H.R. CONF. REP. No. 91-1793, p. 8; 116 CONG. REC. 44,439 (1970)
(statement of Sen. Holland)).
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it must at the very least mean that a bare congressional desire to harm a
politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental
interest." "'
Since Justice Brennan's conclusion was stated baldly, the constitutional
harms he sought to avoid or the value he sought to protect or advance
are not self-evident. Tracing the cases and doctrines relied upon by the
court below offers the only clues to the doctrinal basis of the Supreme
Court's condemnation of purpose in Moreno. The Court's sole citation
on that point is to a footnote in the opinion below, in which the district
court had stated that "[a] purpose to discriminate against hippies cannot,
in and of itself and without reference to the protection of morals or similar
considerations in the public interest, justify the 1971 amendment."' 35 In
support of this view, the district court had cited a state court decision
condemning a public property use ordinance expressly intended to keep
the public parks and beaches of Carmel-by-the-Sea free of the menace
of "undesirable and unsanitary visitors ...sometimes known as 'hippies. "' The California Supreme Court had condemned the ordinance's
purpose as violative of equal protection based on the United States Supreme Court's condemnation of enactments based on racial hostility and
antagonism toward aliens.' 37 The California court had also relied upon
Professors Joseph Tussman's and Jacobus ten Broek's conclusion that
equal protection is violated "when and if the proscribed motives [of
hostility and prejudice]38 replace a concern for the public good as the
'purpose' of the law."' This statement goes beyond the not surprising
principle that the purpose of legislation, as well as the classification
employed, can violate equal protection,-a principle first made explicit
in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, " a case involving hostility based on race, national
origin and alienage. There is no longer any question that an enactment
neutral on its face-not employing a race specific classification-is invalid
if its animating purpose or motive is discriminatory. " The questions,
134. Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534 (emphasis in original).
135. Id. at 534-35 (quoting 345 F.Supp. 310, 314 n. IIciting Parr v.Municipal Ct., 3 Cal. 3d
861, 479 P.2d 353, 92 Cal. Rptr. 153 (1971)) and noting that "[in order to qualify as 'legitimate'
under the equal protection clause, a legislative purpose must arguably be related to the improvement
of the general welfare," (citing Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV.
1065 at 1081 (1969)).
136. Moreno v. U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, 345 F. Supp. 310, 314 n.l (1972) (citing Parr v.
Municipal Ct., 3 Cal. 3d 861, 479 P.2d 353, 92 Cal. Rptr. 153 (1971)).
137. Id. at 355 (citing Reitman v.Mulkey 387 U.S. 369 (1967) and Truax v.Raich, 239 U.S.
33 (1915)).
138. Tussman & ten Broeck, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 341, 358
(1949).
139. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
140. In addition to Yick Wo, id., see, e.g., Castaneda v.Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977); Carter v.
Jury Comm'n of Greene County, 396 U.S. 320 (1970); Griffin v. County Bd. of Prince Edward
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still unresolved, are determining the values advanced or protected by
resorting to this condemnation of hostile purpose' 4 ' and whether it protects
all groups against majoritarian hostility or only those groups historically
in need of special judicial intervention. 4' 2
Subsequent cases in which reliance is placed on Justice Brennan's
language of condemnation in Moreno have also failed either to address
or to resolve these questions, but the statement has surfaced in Supreme
Court opinions so many times since then that it can be said to have
acquired the status of an independent constitutional principle, albeit one
with an unclear past and uncertain future.' 43 It is impossible to divine
County, 357 U.S. 218 (1964); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960); Hernandez v. Texas,
347 U.S. 475 (1954); Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559 (1953).
141. See infra notes 161-75 and accompanying text.
142. The term "suspect" class originated in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216
(1944), but the Court had long before adopted the view that "unfriendly" racial classifications were
prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. See, e.g., The Slaughter-House
Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). "The existence of laws in the States where the newly
emancipated negroes resided, which discriminated with gross injustice and hardship against them
as a class, was the evil to be remedied by this clause." Id. at 81. In determining whether to give
extraordinary protection under the Fourteenth Amendment to specific catagories of persons, the Court
has, on occasion, relied upon Justice Stone's dictum in Carolene Products' footnote four in which
he suggested that a "more exacting judicial scrutiny" may apply when a statute is "directed at
particular religious or national or racial minorities" [since] "prejudice against discrete and insular
minorities may be a special condition which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political
processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities." United States v. Carolene Products
Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (citation omitted). See, e.g., Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635
(1986) (close relatives not a suspect or quasi-suspect class because "they have not been subjected
to discrimination; they do not exhibit obvious, immutable, or distinguishing characteristics that define
them as a discrete group; and they are not a minority or politically powerless"). Id. at 638 (citation
omitted); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) ("[a]liens as a class are a prime example of
a 'discrete and insular' minority"). Id. at 372 (citation omitted). For the argument that this "ward
of the court" approach to "discrete and insular minorities" lacks constitutional authority unless racial
classifications are involved see Rehnquist, J., dissenting ante in Sugerman v. Dougall, 413 U.S.
634, 657 (1973); see also Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 781 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(except where classifications based on race or on national origin, the first cousin of race, are involved,
heightened scrutiny improper). See generally Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L.
REV. 713 (1985); Ball, Judicial Protection of Racial Minorities, 59 IOWA L. REV. 1059 (1974);
Cover, The Origins of JudicialActivism in the Protection of Minorities, 91 YALE L.J. 1287 (1982).
143. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S.186, 211-12 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Justice Blackmun found two impermissible purposes behind Georgia's sodomy statute: (I) religious
intolerance, id. at 212, and the patent "theological nature of the origin of Anglo-American antisodomy
statutes," id. at 211 n.6 and (2) "[mlere public intolerance or animosity," id. at 212, a principle
he referred to O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975), which concerned confinement
without treatment of the non-dangerous "mental" patient, "capable of surviving safely outside an
institution." He addressed the issue in the following language:
May the State fence in the harmless mentally ill solely to save its citizens from
exposure to those whose ways are different? One might as well ask if the State,
to avoid public unease, could incarcerate all who are physically unattractive
or socially eccentric. Mere public intolerance or animosity cannot constitutionally justify the deprivation of a person's physical liberty.
Id. at 575 (citation omitted).
The cases relied upon in Donaldson in support of this text were, with the exception of Moreno,
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from Moreno whether governmental action undertaken solely as an
expression of hostility to the politically unpopular offends notions of "civil
republicanism" and accompanying conceptions of civic virtue,' undermines a value (or values) such as equality,"4 5 impartiality, freedom of
intimate association,," freedom of expressive association,' 47 personal autonomy,'4 8 ethnic and cultural diversity,' 49 tolerance of dissenting opinFirst Amendment decisions grounded in the principle that the public expression of ideas may not be
prohibited simply because the ideas are themselves offensive to the personal predilections of the
majority. See, e.g., Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969) and Cohen v. California, 403 U.S.
15 (1971).
144. Sunstein, Naked Preferences, supra note 2, at 1691. He also cites Moreno, (as well as
Zobel), as an example of an invalidated classification for which the government is unable to invoke
some public value that the classification at issue can be said to serve. Id. at 1713 and n. 117.
145. An equality principle of treating similarly situated individuals alike-those in need of food
stamps-dictates that there must be a principled reason to distinguish among the subsets of equally
needy but it doesn't tell us why hostility simpliciter is not an acceptable reason.
146. The Court has subsequently distinguished between intimate human relationships protected
by the Due Process Clause and freedom of expressive association. Roberts v. United States Jaycees,
468 U.S. 609 (1984). "[We have long] recognized a right to associate for the purpose of engaging
in those activities protected by the First Amendment..." id. at 618, and "[we have] long recognized
that, because the Bill of Rights is designed to secure individual liberty, it must afford the formation
and preservation of certain kinds of highly personal relationships a substantial measure of sanctuary
from unjustified interference by the State." Id. See generally Karst, The Freedom of Intimate
Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624 (1980).
147. Justice Douglas believed that the flaw in the Moreno scheme was its infringement of the
right of association, "[t]he right to invite the stranger into one's home .. " Moreno, 413 U.S. at
543 (Douglas, J., concurring) but he grounded that right on "[tihe choice of one's associates for
social, political, race, [sic] or religious purposes." Id. at 541 (Douglas, J., concurring) (citing
N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449,460 (1958); DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 363 (1937);
N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429-31 (1963); Gibson v. Florida Legislative Comm., 372
U.S. 539 (1963); N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288 (1964) and Brotherhood of Railroad
Trainmen v. Virginia Bar, 377 U.S. 1,8 (1964)). He supposed that "no one would doubt that an
association of people working in the poverty field [or holding a meeting or convention] would be
entitled to the same constitutional protection as those working in the racial, banking, or agricultural
field," Moreno, 413 U.S. at 541, and stated that "the poor are congregating in households where
they can better meet the adversities of poverty," Id. Justice Douglas concluded that as in Shapiro
v. Thompson, the classification penalized a constitutional right and could not be sustained absent a
compelling state interest. Id. at 545. Arguably, this same interest in associational freedom could
justify the majority's invalidation of purpose.
148. A general interest in personal decision making has never been recognized by the Court
although a number of substantive due process (and equal protection) decisions have recognized
fundamental rights inthe decisions of whether to bear or beget a child, see, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973) (right of privacy protects a woman's decision whether to terminate her pregnancy);
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (fight of individual to be free of government intrusion
into procreative decisions); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (marital intimacies within
zone of privacy); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (marriage and procreation basic civil
right); cf. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (no fundamental right to engage in private,
consensual, homosexual acts of sodomy); Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238 (1976) (grooming standard
for police valid under rationality review).
149. See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 402 (1923) (legislative end "to foster a
homogeneous people with American ideals" not within competence of state in peacetime); see also
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (in which the state's interest in formal instruction of school
age children was subordinated to an interest in preserving Old Order Amish) and Califano v. Jobst,
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ion, 5' freedom of conscience,"5 ' the immorality of hatred' or whether
it is grounded in the belief that judicial legitimization of such meanspirited action would ultimately threaten the public peace and good order
if the resulting repression were to become intolerable.' 5 3 It is possible
that all or none of the above were considerations. The constitutional
origins of Moreno can only be surmised and its progeny shed little light
since its language on illegitimacy of purpose is repeated without explication.
For example, in the immediate aftermath of both Moreno and Maricopa,
the Court rebuffed a challenge to a village ordinance restricting land use
to one family (fewer than three unrelated person) dwellings in Village of
Belle Terre v. Boraas."' The Court dismissed all arguments advanced
against the ordinance's validity, including, (1) that it denied the right to
travel, specifically the right to migrate and to settle within a state guaranteed by Shapiro v. Thompson, ' and (2) that it violated the Moreno
principle that a purpose to exclude any discrete group was an illegitimate
purpose.' 56 Justice Douglas, who had concurred in Moreno based on the
encroachment's interference with associational rights, "' authored a majority opinion which dismissed these arguments out of hand. He noted
434 U.S. 47 (1977). "This is not a case in which the government seeks to foster orthodoxy on the
unwilling." Id. at 54 n.l I.
150. "[l]f there is any principle of the Constitution that more imperatively calls for attachment
than any other it is the principle of free thought-not free thought for those who agree with us but
freedom for the thought that we hate." United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 654-55 (1929)
(Holmes, J., dissenting). For an expression of most of the prevailing rationales for valuing free
speech see Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
151. See, e.g., West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943). "If
there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can
prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or
force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein." See also Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S.
705 (1977); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 546 (1942) (Jackson, J., concurring).
152. History, too, amply illustrates the dreadful wrongs inspired by hatred of those perceived as
"different", as "outsiders". See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 546 (1942) (Jackson, J.,
concurring). It has been remarked before that Carolene Products was decided in the shadow of the
rise of the National Socialist government in Germany with its racist theories; but see Korematsu v.
U.S., 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (exclusion of all American citizens of Japanese origins from West Coast
as security risks justified by military necessity); cf. Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406
(N.D. Cal. 1984); see generally P. IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR (1983).

153. For a parallel reasoning involving the protection of unpopular speech see Whitney v. Califomia, 274 U.S. 357 (1927) ("[O]rder cannot be secured merely through fear of punishment for
its infraction; that it is hazardous to discourage thought, hope and imagination; that fear breeds
repression; that repression breeds hate; that hate menaces stable government; that the path of safety
lies in the opportunity to discuss freely supposed grievances and proposed remedies; and that the
fitting remedy for evil counsels is good ones." Id. at 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring).

154. 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
155. Id. at 7.
156. See Brief for Appellant at 13.
157. Moreno, 413 U.S. at 541, 543 (Douglas, J., concurring).
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that the ordinance was not aimed at transients"' and that no evidence
supported the claim that it "reek[ed] with an animosity to unmarried
couples who live together,"' 59 a charge belied by the ordinance's definition
of family. The charge, of course, was much broader than that suggested
by Justice Douglas' peevish response. The challenger's argument was
that the desire to "fence out" socially undesirable persons or households
and to preserve homogeneity is inconsistent with equality principles, the
right to travel and the fight to privacy. " After Belle Terre it seems clear
that even though "hippies" cannot be denied food stamps on the basis
of their living arrangements if they are otherwise qualified, they can be
zoned out of the neighborhood. 6'
In City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,'62 however, the Court
purported to apply the minimum rationality standard of review employed
when social or economic legislation is at issue but invalidated the denial
of a special use permit to the operator of a proposed group home for
mentally retarded adults as a violation of equal protection, on the authority
of Moreno. The Court declined to hold that mental retardation is a quasisuspect classification entitled to heightened judicial scrutiny'6 3 or that the
city's special use permit requirement was facially invalid. "6Justice White,
writing for the majority, summarized the many interests advanced by the
state"' and concluded that the record did not reveal any "rational" basis
for believing that the group home would constitute a threat to the city's
legitimate interests. '" Since there was an insufficient relationship between
the city's legitimate interests and the special use permit requirement under
the circumstances of the case, he concluded that the only interest advanced
by the requirement was "an irrational prejudice against the mentally
retarded, including those who would occupy the . . . facility and who
would live under the closely supervised and highly regulated conditions
expressly provided for by state and federal law."' 67 Since "some objectives-such as 'a bare. . . desire to harm a politically unpopular group'. . . are not legitimate state interests,"' 68 the requirement as applied was
violative of equal protection.
158. Belle Terre, 416 U.S. at 7.
159. Id. at 8.
160. See Brief for Appellant at Ii, 12 and 21.
161. See generally The Supreme Court 1973 Term, 88 HARV. L. REV. 41, 119-29 (1974); Comment, 'All in the Family', Legal Problems of Communes, HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 393 (1972).
162. 73 U.S. 432 (1985).

163. Id. at 445-46.
164. Id. at 448.
165. Id. at 447.
166. Id. at 448.
167. Id. at 450.
168. Id. at 446 (citing United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534, and Zobel
v. Williams, 457 U.S. at 63).
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In Lyng v. Castillo,'69 however, a case decided contemporaneously with
Soto-Lopez at the end of the 1986 term, Department of Agriculture v.
Moreno surfaced again, but this time the Supreme Court did not share
the district court's belief that recent amendments to the Food Stamp Act
were "hostile to family members" and were even more objectionable
than was the legislation, condemned in Moreno, which harmed "unpopular political groups."' 7 In Lyng, the Court refused to grant heightened
scrutiny to the federal Food Stamp Act's definition of a "household"
which prevented close relatives sharing living quarters from demonstrating that they were separate economic units and therefore entitled to more
benefits."'7 The Lyng majority did not believe that the legislation resulted
from or was intended to express hostility to the living arrangements of
close family members or that it burdened a fundamental right by "'directly
and substantially' interfer[ing] with family living arrangements." 72
' Given
the precedents for according substantive protection to family interests,' 73
it is difficult to understand the Court's acceptance of the scheme's stated
purpose and willingness to assume the inadvertence of its deleterious
effect, particularly in light of evidence suggesting that the decision not
to treat all individuals living in the same home as one household was
based on a Congressional concern over "the impact of the amendment
upon various types of living arrangements."' 74 It is also difficult to understand the challenged amendment as anything other than a tacit assumption either that family members are so apt to lie about their food
purchasing and preparation habits that it would be pointless to allow them
to have an individualized hearing on the matter or that family members
are a significant source of fraud in the program. Justices White and
Marshall, however, were the only justices who believed that Moreno was
indistinguishable since in both cases the distinction bore "no necessary
relation to the prevention of fraud"' 75 and arguably failed "even a rational
basis test."' 76
To sum up, in Edwards v. California, the Court held that prohibiting
the transportation of indigent persons across the California border is not
a legitimate interest of the state. 77
' In Shapiro v. Thompson the Court
held that "the purpose of inhibiting the migration of needy persons into

169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

477 U.S. 635 (1986).
Lyng, 477 U.S. at 637-38.
Id. at 636-37.
Id. at 638 (quoting Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386-87 and n.12 (1978)).
See supra notes 145, 148.
Lyng, 477 U.S. at 641 n.8.
Id. at 646 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
Id.at 646.
314 U.S. 160, 173-74 (1941).
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the state is constitutionally impermissible."' 78 Furthermore, a state could
not apportion benefits or services on the basis of a citizen's past contri' In Moreno v. Department ofAgriculture, the Court
butions as taxpayer. 79
held that a bare desire to injure any unpopular group is an impermissible
purpose.' 8 0 The doctrinal bases of both Edwards and Shapiro are rooted
in the Constitution's creation and protection of our federalist system and
a concern with the relevance of poverty as a classifying factor. Moreno
suggests that it is the Equal Protection Clause itself that is the reason to
invalidate hostility to the unpopular as a government end. 8 ' Zobel is the
decision in which these concerns coalesce.
11. EQUALITY, HOSTILITY AND THE
NEWLY-ARRIVED STATE RESIDENT
A. Zobel v. Williams
"InZobel v. Williams, 82 the Court invalidated as a denial of equal
protection an Alaskan dividend distribution plan which allocated its benefits to adult residents according to length of stay in Alaska. The funds
for the program came from the wealth generated by the oil deposits of
Prudhoe Bay, which at the time of the establishment of the program were
generating "unique economic benefits."' 83 Under the plan enacted in 1980
each adult resident was to receive one dividend unit for each year of
' The plan was
residency subsequent to 1959, the first year of statehood. 84
immediately challenged in state court by two newcomers, Alaska residents
since 1980, who alleged an infringement of their right to migrate and
enjoy "the full rights of Alaska citizenship on the same terms as all other
citizens of the State"' and a denial of equal protection.' Alaska advanced three purposes justifying its classifications in the dividend program: (1) creation of a financial incentive for establishing and maintaining
residence in the state; (2) encouragement of prudent management of the
Permanent Fund and of its natural resources; and (3) recognition of "contributions of various kinds, both tangible and intangible, which residents
had made during their years of residency. "'87 A divided Alaska Supreme
178. 394 U.S. 618, 629 (1969).
179. Id. at 632-33.
180. 413 U.S. at 528, 534 (1973).
181. See, e.g., G. STONE, L. SEIDMAN, C. SUNSTEIN, M. TUSHNET, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 52024(1986).
182. 457 U.S. 55 (1982).
183. Id. at 81 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
184. Id. at 57.
185. Id. at 57-58.
186. Id. at 57.
187. Id. at 61 (citing Williams v. Zobel, 619 P.2d 448, 458 (1980) (footnote omitted)).
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Court had upheld the scheme as justified by all of the state's purposes. 88
That court relied upon the commerce clause analysis of Reeves, Inc. v.
Stake"s9 in which the United States Supreme Court had used the "market
participant" exception to its usual condemnation of a state's efforts to
preserve state-owned resources for in-state use."g Because the Supreme
Court had upheld a commerce clause challenge of South Dakota's confinement of the sale of the cement produced at a state-owned plant to its
residents, the Alaska Court concluded that Alaska's rewarding longtime
residents for their contributions to the public wealth was a permissible
purpose. ' The United States Supreme Court reversed and invalidated
the retrospective aspect of the program as a denial of equal protection. 92
Chief Justice Burger's majority opinion rejected all three of Alaska's
proffered justifications.' 93 The objectives of creating a financial incentive
for permanent Alaska residence and assuring prudent management of the
Permanent Fund and the oil and mineral resources were not rationally
related to the distinctions Alaska sought "to make between newer residents
and those who have been in the state since 1959."'"9 The objective of
rewarding citizens for past contribution was invalidated on the basis of
Justice Brennan's statement in Shapiro v. Thompson that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits an apportionment of state services according to
the past contributions of its citizens. 95 The Chief Justice also resurrected
dictum from Vlandis v. Kline, in which the Court had noted that "apportion[ment of] tuition rates as the basis of the old and new residency

188. Williams v. Zobel, 619 P.2d 448, 459 (1980). The Alaska Court determined that because
the distribution statute was not a "penalty" on interstate migration, id. at 458, strict scrutiny was
not required. Id. The Alaska Court had actually been stricter in reviewing some residency requirements
than the Supreme Court. See, e.g., State v. Adams, 522 P.2d 1125 (Alaska 1974) (one year durational
residency requirement for eligibility to file for a divorce invalid); cf. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393
(1975); see also State v. Van Dort, 502 P.2d 453 (1973) (thirty days maximum permissible durational
residency requirement for voting eligibility); cf. Marston v. Lewis, 410 U.S. 679 (1973) (upholding
Arizona's 50-day durational residency requirement for voting eligibility).
189. 447 U.S. 429 (1980).
190. Zobel, 619 P.2d at 460 (citing Reeves, 447 U.S. at 442, "The State's refusal to sell to
buyers other than South Dakotans is 'protectionist' only in the sense that it limits benefits generated
by a state program to those who fund the state treasury and whom the state was created to serve."
(emphasis added)). See also Hughes v. Alexandra Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976). See generally
Anson & Schlenkkan, Federalism the Dormant Commerce Clause, and State-owned Resources, 59
TEX. L. REV. 71 (1980); Wells & Hellerstein, The Governmental-ProprietaryDistinction in ConstitutionalLaw, 66 VA. L. REV. 1073 (1980).
191. Zobel, 619 P.2d at 460. "We think that this analysis is persuasive in concluding that
rewarding past intangible contributions is also a permissible purpose, albeit not a particularly compelling one." Id.
192. Zobel, 457 U.S. at 65.
193. Id. at 61-63.
194. Id. at 61 (footnote omitted).
195. Id. at 63 (citing Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 632-33).
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• . .would give rise to grave problems under the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment."' 96
The majority did not apply the Article IV Privileges and Immunities
Clause, noting that Alaska's scheme did "not involve the kind of discrimination which [that clause] was designed to prevent." 97
' Nor did they
hold that the retrospective aspects of the plan violated the constitutional
right to travel,' 98 but did note that the right to travel cases not only
protected against actual barriers to migration but also protected against
residency requirements which disadvantage newcomers. '99
Since under the Alaska dividend distribution plan each adult resident
was to receive one dividend unit for each year of state residency subsequent to 1959, the year of Alaska's statehood, 2" it was markedly different from those durational residency requirements invalidated in the
prior right to travel case. Alaska did not impose any threshold waiting
period. Every adult state resident had an entitlement to receive some
payment from the fund. Even one who had resided in Alaska for only
part of the year would receive a benefit, prorated on the basis of the
number of months of state residence. 2"' The statutory distinction was
based solely and permanently on length of residence. The alleged discrimination did not favor native-born Alaskans over those born elsewhere.
It simply favored those who had been in Alaska the longest, with most
favored status accorded those who had been continuously resident since
the advent of statehood. The majority believed that this distinction violated an equality principle although the Court's prior equality jurisprudence does not support the holding in this case.20 2
The majority held that the scheme could not pass even minimum rationality,2 °3 yet proceeded to scrutinize closely the relationship between
the two admittedly valid purposes and the statutory distinctions.204 Finding
insufficient rationality, the Court then invalidated the one purpose to which
196. Zobel, 457 U.S. at 63 (citing Vlandis, 412 U.S. 441, 449-50 & n.6 (1973)).
197. Zobel, 457 U.S. at 59 n.5 (citing Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 395 (1948) ([Privileges
and Immunities Clause] "was designed to insure to a citizen of State A who ventures into State B
the same privileges which the citizens of State B enjoy")).
198. The Court did not rely on right to travel doctrine, stating that "[iln reality, right to travel
analysis refers to little more than a particular application of equal protection analysis." Zobel, 457
U.S. at 60 n.6. For the view that right to travel issues, of Shapiro and Maricopa are not equal
protection issues, see, e.g., L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1003-05, 1118 (1978)
(welfare and poverty issues involved); Perry, Modern Equal Protection, A Conceptualization and
Appraisal, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1023, 1075 (1979) (statutes interfere with right of interstate migration).
199. Zobel, 457 U.S. at 60 n.6.
200. Id. at 59 n.4 (citing ALASKA STAT. §43.25.010(b) (Supp. 1981)).
201. Zobel, 457 U.S. at 59 n.4.
202. See supra notes 305-17 and accompanying text.
203. The Zobel Court did not decide whether "enhanced scrutiny was called for," since the statute
flunked the "minimal" test. 457 U.S. at 60-61.
204. Id. at 61-63.

Spring 1989]

MORE EQUAL THAN OTHERS

the means were at least rationally related, rewarding past contributions,2 5
a result concurred in by Justice Brennan.2 °6 In fact, Justice Brennan
offered a rationale for invalidation of possibly even the prospective application of the scheme, based primarily on equality principles as well
as concepts of federalism. 0 7
Concurring only in the judgment,2 8 Justice O'Connor disagreed with
the Court's labelling of Alaska's desire to compensate its citizens for past
contributions as illegitimate." Justice O'Connor criticized the majority
for invalidating the legislative end of recognizing the past contributions
of its citizens, an end which she found neither "invidious" nor "irrational," 2 1 stating that "[u]nder some circumstances, the objective may
be wholly reasonable. "21 It is difficult to ascertain what Justice O'Connor
meant by her use of the words "irrational" and "unreasonable" as a test
for permissibility of purpose. Justice O'Connor's statement that "[e]ven
a generalized desire to reward citizens for past endurance, particularly in
a State where years of hardship only recently have produced.prosperity,
is not innately improper,' 212 suggests a concern with legitimacy rather
than ends-means rationality. Finding the Court's analysis of the illegitimate purpose too ambiguous and the resulting jurisprudence too uncertain,21 3 she eschewed a reliance on equal protection and invalidated the
Id. at 63.
Id. at 68 (Brennan, J., concurring).
Id. at 66-7 1.
Id. at 71 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Id. at 72.
Id.
Id.
A State, for example, might choose to divide its largess among all persons who
previously have contributed their time to volunteer community organizations.
If the State graded its dividends according to the number of years devoted to
prior community service, it could be said that the State intended 'to reward
citizens for past contributions.' Alternatively, a State might enact a tax credit
for citizens who contribute to the State's ecology by building alternative fuel
sources or establishing recycling plants. If the State made this credit retroactive,
to benefit those citizens who launched these improvements before they became
fashionable, the state once again would be rewarding past contributions. The
Court's opinion would dismiss these objectives as wholly illegitimate. I would
recognize them as valid goals and inquire only whether their implementation
infringed any constitutionally protected interest.
Id. at 72 n.1.
212. Zobel, 457 U.S. at 72 (emphasis added).
213. Id. at 73. Justice O'Connor posed the following questions: "What makes Alaska's purpose
illegitimate? Is the purpose illegitimate under all circumstances? What other state interests are wholly
illegitimate? Will an 'illegitimate' purpose survive review if it becomes 'important' or 'compelling?"'
Id. These questions, important as they are, have not been answered. Justice O'Connor also argued
that "the Court's opinion, although purporting to apply a deferential standard of review, actually
insures that any governmental program depending upon a 'past contributions' rationale will violate
the Equal Protection Clause." Id. at 73 n.2.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 19

scheme as violative of federalism principles." 4
The Justices are singularly unconvincing in their attempts to explain
why the Constitution damns a desire to reward prior contributions. For
example, Chief Justice Burger also opined in a puzzling footnote that
"[elven if the objective of rewarding past contributions were valid, it
would be ironic to apply that rationale here." 2 '5 It is not clear that the
equal protection clause is offended by wry humor. Since Chief Justice
Burger quoted language from the legislative debate on the dividend statute
in which a state representative had remarked that that pipeline, which
had been the entity that allowed the legislature "to do all the things" they
were considering doing, could not have been built without the newcomers.2" 6 It may be that he meant that the application would be perverse.
That is, even if the rewards for past contributions were a valid objective,
the statutory classification lacked sufficient connection to that purpose.
If Chief Justice Burger really believed that irony offends the Fourteenth
Amendment, then much of his Court's work is suspect. For example,
Dandridge v. Williams2" 7 upheld against an equal protection challenge a
state's Aid to Dependent Children program which gave eligible families
their computed "standard of need" up to a maximum limitation on the
total amount. The total amount did not reflect the actual needs of families
with more than eight children, the maximum number whose needs were
factored in when determining grant size. 2" 8 In Wyman v. James,2 9 which
Justice Douglas characterized as "ideologically of the same vintage as
Miln,"22 ° the majority characterized welfare benefits as a "gratuity" in
holding that the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of "unreasonable" searches
is not violated by a state's termination of the benefits of an individual
who did not admit the state's social worker upon an unannounced "visit"
for the purpose of ferreting out welfare fraud. 22 ' Aid to Families with
Dependent Children is a program designed to provide the very necessities
of life. The Alaska dividend distribution program is one that strains the

214. Viewing Alaska's scheme as imposing a relative burden on those who had migrated to the
state after 1959, Justice O'Connor analyzed the scheme under the Court's Article IV Privileges and
Immunities jurisprudence, and found itwanting. Id. at 74-81.
215. Id. at 63 n.10.
216. Id.

217. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
218. Id. at 473-74 & n.3.
219. 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
220. Id. at 332 n.9 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
221. Id. at 324. The Warren Court had rejected the notion that the Fourth Amendment was
concerned only with searches for evidence of crime. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523
(1967) (even the most law-abiding citizen has a very tangible interest in limiting the circumstances
under which the sanctity of his home may be broken into by official authority). Id. at 530-3 1. Cf.
Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
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very meaning of entitlement,222 since every state resident over eighteen
was "entitled" to some allotment of the goodies. Yet the means of subsistence may be denied solely upon the accident of being born into too
large a family, or because of noncompliance with intrusive governmental
conditions that are offensive to values enshrined in the text of the Constitution.
Zobel clearly does not fit into any of the Court's previous "equality"
jurisprudence. The Court has frequently justified its intensive scrutiny of
certain "sensitive" classifications because the traits involved were irrelevant to individual merit,
yet there is certainly at least an arguable
connection between duration of residence and contribution to the state.224
Zobel's invalidation of ends-and means-however, raises doubt about
the constitutionality of well-intended social welfare programs conditioned
upon length of state residence, such as Alaska's "pioneer homes ' 225 or
its "longevity bonuses. ' 22 6 There is no "penalty" involved as that word
222. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (welfare benefits as statutory entitlements
cannot be terminated without procedural due process); accord Bell v. Burson 402 U.S. 535 (1971)
(driver's license). See also Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1963); cf. Simon, The
Invention and Reinvention of Welfare Rights, 44 MD. L. REV. I (1985).
223. See, e.g., Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S.. 495, 505 (1976) ("[Tlhe legal status of illegitimacy
...is, like race or national origin, a characteristic determined by causes not within the control of
the illegitimate individual, and it bears no relation to the individual's ability to participate in and
contribute to society").
224. The Alaska Supreme Court relied upon the following passage in justification of the state's
interest in rewarding past contributions by length of residence. "[Tihe state's low population and
sudden assumption of statehood responsibilities in 1959 made the next few years difficult for the
state and its residents. Zobel, 619 P.2d at 462 n.37. 'A government such as the one embodied in
the Alaska constitution, however, with its complete range of governmental services, was expensive
for a State with limited sources of taxation. . . . [R]evenues were small. Yet, the demands were
great. The State government had to provide all the governmental services and social overhead required
by modern American society. For instance, it would have been relatively simple to build a few
roads, furnish normal police protection, and establish the customary school facilities. But nothing
was normal in Alaska; it was and remains a land of superlatives. Subarctic engineering is relatively
new, but the State would have to face the problem of permafrost conditions that frequently cause
the roadtop to buckle and heave. Police protection would have to be provided for an area one-fifth
the size of the forty-eight United States but with very few roads available. Flying would become a
way of life for law enforcement officials as well as other Alaskans-an expensive way of life. 'Bush
schools' scattered along the Aleutian chain, through the Yukon Valley, and on the Seward Peninsula
and the islands of southeastern Alaska were expensive to maintain. It was not until the discovery
of oil on a large scale that the picture changed."' Id. (citing C.M. NASKE, AN INTERPRETATIVE
HISTORY OF ALASKAN STATEHOOD 169-70 (1973)).
225. ALASKA STAT. §47.25.010 et seq. Admission is conditioned on 15 years' residence immediately preceding application. Id. at §§ 47.25.020-.25.030.
226. Id. at § 47.45.010. Eligibility is conditioned upon age and residence for one year preceding
application. Id. It has been suggested that these programs were "designed to help those individuals
who would like to retire in the state but cannot [afford its] high cost of living." Zobel, 619 P.2d at
469 n.13, (Dimond, J., dissenting). If that is in fact so, these measures are doubly vulnerablefirst as invalid efforts to reward past contributions and second as efforts to deter out-migration, an
end which Justice Burger suggested would raise "insurmountable constitutional difficulties." Zobel,
457 U.S. at 62 n.9 (citation omitted). That conclusion would seem to doom efforts such as Alaska's
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has been used in durational residency requirement cases. A true penalty
on the exercise of the right to travel would be a prohibition against the
out-migration of those residents who had received welfare payments but
were now in a position to repay the state. Arguably, since a state has a
valid interest in the recoupment of welfare payments, there is nothing
irrational about using these means to protect against its abuse. Others
who owe a debt to society are not able to leave at will, yet the Constitution
is not offended.227 But there is clearly something about such a scheme
that gives pause-and that is its discrimination against the impoverished,
not its impact on the right to seek opportunity elsewhere. Nor does the
Alaska scheme present any barrier or meaningful deterrence to interstate
migration. If anything, it offers an inducement. Any deprivation of benefits in Zobel was relative, not absolute and not of earthshaking importance.
In Sosna v. Iowa22 the Court upheld a state's durational residency for
divorce against an equal protection challenge based on the right to travel,
yet in Sosna the deprivation was not temporary but absolute for the period
of disability and impinged upon not one but two fundamental intereststhe right to marry and the right to migrate and settle.
The Court's invalidation of Alaska's recognition of past contributions
purpose smacks of its discarded irrebuttable presumption analysis.229 But
surely Zobel does not stand for the proposition that a state may never
withhold a "bonus" from its citizens because past contributions are not
universally and necessarily determined by length of residence. Therefore,
an individualized hearing for each citizen to determine his or her contribution to the common good is mandated.
Justice O'Connor to the contrary notwithstanding, Article VI privileges
and immunities are not implicated.23 Because the discrimination did not
forgiveness of student loans based on years worked in the state (ALASKA STAT. §§ 14.40.763 and
14.40.825 (1980))-efforts designed to prevent population turnover, despite the severity of Alaska's
problem. For example, between 1965 and 1970 for every six individuals who moved into the state,
five left. Zobel, 619 P.2d at 459 n.33 (quoting Alaska Dept. of Labor, Alaska Population Overview
30-31 (1979) (footnotes omitted)). After Zobel, decisions such as Fisher v. Reiser, 610 F.2d 629
(9th Cir. 1979) (Nevada statute which limited cost-of-living increase in workers' compensation
benefits to recipients living in state did not burden right to travel so as to require strict scrutiny) are
doubtful authority.
227. See, e.g., Jones v.Helms, 452 U.S. 412 (1981) (parental abandonment of child a misdemeanor but a felony if parent thereafter leaves state).
228. 419 U.S. 393 (1975); see supra notes 111-20 and accompanying text.
229. See Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 452 (1973) ("[lIt is forbidden by the Due Process
Clause to deny an individual [tuition rates] on the basis of a permanent and irrebuttable presumption
of non-residence, when that presumption is not necessarily or universally true in fact"); accord
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); Department of Agriculture v. Murry, 413
U.S. 508 (1973); but see Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975). See generally Note, The
Irrebuttable Presumption Analysis in the Supreme Court, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1534 (1974); Note,
IrrebuttablePresumptions: An Illusory Analysis, 27 STAN. L. REV. 449 (1975).
230. "[The art.
IV Privileges and Immunities Clause] threw around them ... no security for the
citizen of the State in which they were claimed or exercised. Nor did it profess to control the power
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result from an inability to vote for one's political representatives, it can
not be argued that the normal political restraints on legislative action are
lacking so as to require judicial intervention.23" ' The fear of hostile retaliatory legislation is beside the point, since out-of-state residents are not
the ones challenging the legislation.232
There are two hitherto articulated principles that at least explain if not
justify the results in Zobel. One is the notion that the government may
not act to disadvantage an unpopular group solely because they are unpopular.233 This reading of the case has the weakness of assuming that
hostility to newcomers was involved, but at least identifies a defensible
principle-hostility without more is not an acceptable reason for a disfavored status even when only economic benefits are involved. In that
regard it should be noted that the Cleburne Court cited Zobel as well as
Moreno when it again condemned a state purpose to harm a "politically
unpopular group. "234 This, of course, does nothing to explain the Court's
willingness to invalidate the retrospective aspect of Alaska's scheme in
its entirety. A scheme which discriminates against younger residents, as
the Court noted this one might, usually does not violate the Court's notions
of equality, since age has never triggered more exacting scrutiny235 nor
been regarded as so irrelevant that age based classifications are constitutionally impermissible.2 36 The result of the Court's logic is that in fact
Alaska now gives a dividend check from the Prudhoe Bay2 3fund
to "each
7
of [its], 530,000 residents, including 1-year old babies. ,
Justice Brennan's concurrence added to the doctrinal confusion in the
of the State governments over the rights of its own citizens." The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S.
(16 Wall.) 36, 77 (1873).
231. "The Clause has been a necessary limitation on state autonomy not simply because of the
self-interest of individual States, but because state parochialism is likely to go unchecked by state
political processes when those who are disadvantaged are by definition disenfranchised as well."
United Bldg. & Constr. Trades v. Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 230 (1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
232. The clause exists to avoid leaving the protection of equality "to the uncertain remedies
afforded by diplomatic processes and official retaliation." Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 395
(1948) (footnote omitted). Retaliatory measures themselves are to be discouraged not just for their
ineffectiveness but because they do violence to our concepts of national unity.
233. See Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
234. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 466 (1985) (citations
omitted).
235. See, e.g., Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976).
236. See, e.g., T.L.O. v. New Jersey, 469 U.S. 325, (1985) (fourth amendment strictures); H.L.
v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981) (abortion decisions); Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S.
678 (1977) (privacy rights); Ginsburg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968) (first amendment rights
of children not co-extensive with those of adults). See also Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984)
(juveniles, unlike adults, are always in some of form of custody); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S.
747 (1982) (compelling governmental interest in protecting children's physical and psychological
well being); cf. Tinker v. Des Moines, 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (first amendment rights available to
teachers and students).
237. N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1987, at A 14, col. 2. Immediately after the Zobel decision, the Alaska
legislature set up a new distribution plan. See 1982 Alaska Sess. Laws, § 19, Chap. 102.
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Court's invalidation of the state's purpose of rewarding past contributions
by length of residence. It is Alaska's choice of means, however, and not
the ends that is vulnerable according to Justice Brennan's rationale. Justice Brennan noted that the tenuous relationship between the actual service of individuals and length of residence indicated the scheme's
lack of "a rational predicate" for the classification.23 Furthermore, according to Justice Brennan, length of residence can be a proxy for both
allegiance and attachment to a state 239 "to test the bona fides of citizenship. 240 His statement that allegiance and attachment are relevant to
"a very limited number of legitimate state purposes, ' 241suggests that it
is the classification itself which is invalid. If both means and end are
invalid, then length of residence can never be used to classify for any
purpose other than determining domicile.
Justice Brennan also expressed a concern based on principles of nationalism in the guise of federalism in support of his view that such
classifications should be disfavored-a concern that, if every state were
free to enact statutes distributing the state's revenues to the general citizenry based on length of residence, interstate mobility would be impeded
by a fear of losing a favored status that could never be regained at least
relative to the "old timers" once one migrated.242 This possibility of
retributive disbursement schemes gives rise to a poignant image of wandering migrants, modern day Philip Nolans, who, if not without a "country," are without a state in which they are accorded full citizenship.
Political reality, however, suggests otherwise since these distinctions may
be erased in time so long as "newcomers" have full political rights. This
is not to suggest that a distinction that impinged on an important interest
should ever be left to the vagaries of "catching up," but simply to note
that Justice Brennan's concern with equality in this instance is based on
the notion that our federal structure was created in order to promote
rootlessness and economic nomadism. 243 He fears that "the mobility so
essential to the economic progress of our Nation, and so commonly
accepted as a fundamental aspect of our social order, would not long
survive. 244 It is just as possible that we will not survive the American
penchant for exhausting resources, fouling the environment, and moving
on to unspoiled sites.
238. Zobel, 457 U.S. at-71 (Brnnan,--J., concurring).
239. Id. at 70.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id.at 68.
243. This is not to deny that to a degree it was. See, e.g., THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, 1,
45 (1981). "Against ... the need for republican simplicity and public-spiritedness, the Federalists
put forth the diversity of the extended commercial republic."
244. Zobel, 457 U.S. at 68.
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Adding to the doctrinal confusion, Justice Brennan insisted that the
heritage of the acknowledged illegitimacy of the state's purpose is not
"the structure of the Federal Union" '45 but instead is found in "the idea
of constitutionally protected equality." 2" He stated that the scheme involves constitutionally suspect discrimination even if it had no application
to migrants from sister states, because discrimination is suspect the citizenship clause of the Fourteenth Amendment "does not provide for, and
does not allow for, degrees of citizenship based on length of residence.
And the Equal Protection Clause would not tolerate such distinctions. In
short, as much as the right to travel, equality of citizenship is of the
essence in our Republic." 247
Justice Brennan seems to fear that the spirit of the much feared Society
of the Cincinnati post-Revolutionary years248 is alive among us, at least
in Alaska. He found textual support for his condemnation of legislative
purpose not just in the citizenship clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
but also in Article I's proscriptions against grants of titles of nobility by
the United States, noting that it reflects an "American aversion to aris'
tocracy [which] developed long before the Fourteenth Amendment." 249
It is beyond quibble that the colonial experience gave rise to deep-seated
and widespread hostility towards monarchs and lords,250 but it is difficult
to understand what light that sheds on the constitutional validity of rewarding citizens for their past contributions on the basis of length of
residence. It is also puzzling that he did not also cite Article I's language
which also forbids the grant of a title of nobility by a state.25 ' His quotation
from the Virginia Declaration of Rights of 1776--"'no man or set of
men, are entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges from
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 69-70 (footnote omitted). See generally Varat, State Citizenship and Interstate Equality,
48 U. CHI. L. REV. 487 (1983); for a discussion generally approving the Zobel result but noting its
"doctrinal cacophony," see Cohen, Equal Treatmentfor Newcomers: The Core Meaning of National
and State Citizenship, I CONST. COMMENTARY 9, 12-17 (1984).
248. For an entertaining account of the political fortunes of the group, which, although founded
in 1783 to nurture "wartime associations in a spirit of camaraderie with the grandest ploughman of
them all-Washington--as its nominal chief" ended as a target of the antifederalists fear and loathing
when its "European trappings" and efforts to secure half-pay for life were perceived as efforts to
perpetuate a "caste system" and create orders of "peerage and knighthood." See, R. RUTLAND, THE
ORDER OF THE CONSTITUTION, 44-45 (1983) (citations omitted). For a study of George Washington's
charismatic leadership and the significance of his acts expressed in symbols such as sculpture, stories,
songs, poetry, songs and painting, see G. WILLS, CINCINATUS: GEORGE WASHINGTON & THE ENLIGHTENMENT (1984).
249. Zobel, 457 U.S. at 69 n.3.
250. "Nothing need be said to illustrate the importance of the prohibition of titles of nobility.
This may truly be denominated the comer stone [sic] of republican government: for so long as they
are excluded, there can never be serious danger that the government will be any other than that of
the people." THE FEDERALIST No. 84 (A. Hamilton).
251. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 10.
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the community, but in consideration of publick (sic) services,'"252 also
does little to advance our understanding. In fact, that statement lends
support to the validity of Alaska's purpose, given that the distribution
was based not on heredity but time spent in Alaska. If Justice Brennan
believes that giving someone a larger share of the public purse is suspect
based on length of service, or service during certain periods, he should
condemn all veteran's benefits as too reminiscent of George IV's reward
of a title-Baron Nelson of the Nile-for Horatio Nelson's success in
checking Napoleon's planned attack in Egypt, or as of a piece with Great
Britain's gift of Blenheim Palace to the 1st Duke of Marlborough for his
victory over Louis XIV's armies in the Battle of Blenheim.
The doctrinal basis of the Zobel result is uncertain, but its meaning
for residency requirements is even more difficult to discern. For example,
why did Justice Brennan not dissent (at least in the factual situation) in
Martinez v. Bynum?253 The Court by an eight to one vote upheld the facial
validity of a state residency requirement which permitted a school district
to deny tuition free education to a child who lived apart from his parent
or lawful guardian if the child's primary purpose in the school district
was "for the primary purpose" of attending school in the district.The
challenge had been brought by a minor, Roberto Morales, born in the
United States to parents who were citizens and residents of Mexico and
living in Texas with Oralia Martinez his sister and custodian (but not
lawful guardian) in order to attend school.254 The majority treated the
requirement as a bona fide residency requirement which served the "substantial state interest in assuring that services provided for its residents
are enjoyed only by residents"2'55 and the state's interest in "proper planning and operation of the schools." 2'56 Although the minor's interest in
education was involved, an interest deprivation which has received heightened scrutiny in other contexts,257 and although the scheme would work
an absolute deprivation on the minor seeking a better education by living
apart from her or his parents, 258 the scheme was given deferential ration252. Zobel, 457 U.S. at 69 n.3 (quoting the Virginia Declaration of Rights (1776) in R. RUTLAND,
App. A. (1955)).
253. 461 U.S. 321 (1983).
254. Id. at 322-23.
255. Id. at 328 (emphasis added).
256. Id. at 329.
257. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221-23 (1982); (education is not a fundamental
right but "neither is merely some form of government benefit indistinguishable from other forms of
social welfare legislation"); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) ("education is
perhaps the most important function of state and local governments").
258. See, e.g., San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 37 (1973) (judgment reserved
on constitutionality of system that "occasioned an absolute denial of educational opportunities to
any of its children").

THE BIRTH OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS,
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ality scrutiny since it was not based on a suspect classification nor did it
limit the exercise of a fundamental right.259 Does Martinez mean that instate/out-of-state tuition differentials for higher education are still permissible, despite Zobel?2 " Martinez also gives credence to a view that a
state could impose a complete bar to out-of-state students' attendance at
its colleges and universities."'
Given the uniqueness of Alaska's distribution plan in 1982, Zobel could
have been viewed as a waste of the Court's time perhaps, but not a
harbinger of any noteworthy constitutional developments. After all, the
issue in Zobel was lack of an equal opportunity to share equally in a
windfall. When Hooper and Soto-Lopez followed, however, Zobel's condemnation of Alaska's legislative purpose of rewarding past contributions
began to assume greater doctrinal importance.
B. Hooper v. Bernalillo
In Hooper v. Bernalillo,26 2 a majority of the Court had no difficulty
invalidating the New Mexico statutory scheme's property tax exemption
for those Vietnam era veterans who were resident in the state prior to
May 1976, finding that the "fixed date" requirement violated equal protection. 26' The Court purported to apply a minimum rationality standard
of review to the distinction between classes of resident veterans, 2' but
rejected the state's "legitimate" objective of encouraging veterans to settle
' 26 5 in the state as not rationally related to "such retroactive legislation"
which left the sole purpose of "singling out previous residents for the
tax exemption, rewards only those citizens for their 'past contributions'
toward our Nation's military effort in Vietnam,"-an objective condemned by Zobel .2'The flaw in the statute was not the distinction between
veterans and all other state residents. Since veterans preferences are viewed
as a legitimate effort to compensate veterans for past contributions, they
have withstood numerous constitutional challenges over the years. 267 That
the nation owes a debt of gratitude to veterans, both for the disruption
of their lives and the burdens they assumed on behalf of their fellow
countrymen, is as close to changeless as anything in our fluid equal
259. Martinez, 461 U.S. at 328.
260. See generally Note, Tuition Residence Requirements: A Second Look in Light of Zobel and
Martinez, 61 IND. L.J. 287 (1985-86).
261. Cf. 461 U.S. at 340 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
262. 472 U.S. 612 (1985).
263. Id. at 623.
264. Id. at 618.
265. Id. at 619 (footnote omitted).
266. Id. at 622-23.
267. See infra notes 270-77 and accompanying text.
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protection jurisprudence. Nor did the Court find fault with the statutory
distinction between residents and nonresidents since there was neither a
durational residency requirement such as invalidated under Shapiro and
its progeny nor even a test of the bona fides of state residence. But the
distinction between resident Vietnam vets was fatal because the tax exemption statute created "fixed, permanent distinctions between

. . .

classes

of concededly bona fide residents, based on how long they had been in
'
the State." 268
In dissenting, Justice Stevens noted that unlike Alaska's scheme which
had "no rational justification other than a purpose to allocate a cash surplus
among the majority of the citizenry on the basis of the duration of their
residence in the State, ' 269 New Mexico had a legitimate interest in rewarding veterans for their past contributions. He also speculated that the
statutory distinction might also have the purpose and effect of preventing
"double-dipping" by veterans who had already received benefits in another state-an objective he impliedly deemed constitutional. 27" The classification in Zobel created a permanent group of "second class citizens."
In contrast, the late arriving veteran in New Mexico was treated precisely
the same as "the vast majority of the residents of New Mexico" 2 7 -a
distinction that does not violate the equality principle of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
The result in Hooper is even more difficult to justify than that in Zobel
because the New Mexico scheme did not involve a suspect or quasisuspect class, a politically powerless minority or a group that inspires
hostility. Indeed, veterans traditionally have received such favorable treatment in such myriad forms as bonuses, preferences, exemptions and
benefits that it can be said that they are the antithesis of a despised
minority. The question whether the government may act to reward veterans of military service for past contributions to the common weal, even
though non-veteran groups are not benefited and may even be disadvantaged, sometimes severely, is one that has arisen in a number of contexts.
In 1983 Justice Rehnquist wrote that the country's "longstanding policy
of compensating veterans for their past contributions by providing them
with numerous advantages . . . 'has always been deemed to be legiti-

mate.' "272 Constitutional history up to that point bore him out. In 1943,
the Court noted that veterans have been obligated "to take up the burdens
of the nation," a statement that has been used ever since to justify fa268. Hooper, 472 U.S. at 629 (citing Zobel, 457 U.S. 55, 59 (1981)).
269. Hooper, 472 U.S. at 629 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
270. Id. at 631, n.10.
271. Id. at 630.
272. Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 551 (1983) (citing Personnel
Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 n.25 (1979)).
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vorable treatment."' In 1974 the Court, without dissent, upheld the
Congressional denial of G.I. benefits to conscientious objectors on the
grounds that veterans are more deserving since they have subjected themselves to "mental and physical hazards as well as the economic and family
detriments which are peculiar to military service and which do not exist
in normal civil life.

'2 74

In 1979 the Court upheld the most extreme

veterans' preference in the nation against the charge that the law was
impermissibly sex-biased given the law's "severe" impact on the "public
employment opportunities of women." 275 Other issues divided the Court,
but the legitimacy of the state's purpose to aid veterans was unquestioned
by both majority and dissenters.276 Indeed, it was described as "worthy"
as well as legitimate.2 77 And in 1983, the Court unanimously held that it
was "not irrational" for Congress to decide to subsidize lobbying by
veterans organizations, even though
"it will not subsidize substantial
2 7
lobbying by charities generally.

1

How then, to explain Hooper in which the Court said that New Mexico
could not reward veterans for past contributions through a property tax
exemption? Arguably, the result is easily explained by treating the constitutional flaw as one of means rather than ends. After all, the exemption
applied only to those veterans who had settled in New Mexico before a
certain date. The means of reward then was an impermissible preference
between subsets of veterans all of whom are bona fide residents. If New
Mexico is to reward one veteran, it must reward them all.279 The law, in
the Court's conclusion, however, "suffer[ed] from the same constitutional
flaw as the Alaska statute in Zobel.""° The state may not reward only
previous residents for their past contributions towards our nation's military
effort. And that we are told is so because "Zobel teaches that such an
objective is 'not a legitimate state purpose.' "28 It is difficult to understand
the majority's decision in any other terms. If the means rather than the
ends are flawed, where in the Constitution is the state commanded to
treat all veterans the same? Surely not in the Equal Protection Clause,
which usually permits a classification that does not impinge on extraordinary protected groups or interests to be drawn imprecisely, even care273. Boone v. Lightner, 319 U.S. 561, 575 (1943).
274. Johnson v. Robinson, 415 U.S. 361, 380 (1974).
275. Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 271 (1979).
276. See id. at 281 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
277. Id. at 260.
278. Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 550 (1983). "Resident veterans, as
a group, may well deserve preferential treatment, and such differential treatment vis-d-vis nonveterans does not offend the Equal Protection Clause." Hooper, 472 U.S. at 620 (footnotes omitted).
279. Id. at 621.
280. Id. at 622 (footnote omitted).
281. Id. at 623 (citing Zobel, 457 U.S. at 63) (emphasis added).

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 19

lessly. Why should the "time honored" permissibility of veterans' preferences
give rise to a command for equality of preference? There is nothing
irrational about the scheme; it seems to reflect a desire to limit the class
of beneficiaries for fiscal reasons-a justification accepted by Justice
Stevens. 28 2 The Court has never required the government to extend social
and economic benefits to all possible members of a class, so long as the
limitation was not meant to discriminate against an unpopular or unrepresented group. Arguably, the Court is trying to do nothing more than
make amends for our national indifference to Vietnam era veterans but
this seems a peculiar and unwise way to go about it.
C. Attorney General of New York v. Soto-Lopez
The Burger Court's last word on the constitutionality of benefits granted
to a class of state residents defined in part by time of migration came at
the end of its last term. In Attorney Generalof New York v. Soto-Lopez,283
a doctrinally divided court invalidated New York's civil service employment preference, available only to those otherwise qualified veterans who
were New York residents when they entered military service, as violative
of the equal protection rights of resident veterans who lived outside the
state when they entered military service.284 Four of the justices were also
of the opinion that the right to travel was implicated,285 while three of
the justices found no violation of either equality or interstate harmony
principles in the prior residency requirement.286
Justice Brennan wrote a plurality opinion which is noteworthy in a
number of respects.287 One is the emphasis he placed on the right to travel,
particularly the right of interstate migration which he deemed penalized
by the substantial benefit permanently denied to those who were nonresidents at a prior point in time.288 It is difficult to understand how the
denial of a one-time addition of points to a score is a substantial deprivation, never mind more substantial than the absolute deprivation of the
ability to reorder one's life and free oneself from the legal claims of an
unwanted spouse by seeking a divorce that passed constitutional muster
in Sosna v. Iowa.289
In Soto-Lopez, however, the right to migrate was "penalized"; there282.
283.
284.
(White,
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.

Hooper, 472 U.S. at 633 n. 10 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
476 U.S. 898 (1986).
Id. at 911-12 (plurality opinion); 912-13 (Burger, C.J., concurring in the judgment); 916
J., concurring in the judgment).
Id. at 911-12 (plurality opinion).
Id. at 916 (Stevens, J., dissenting); 918 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 899-912 (plurality opinion).
Id. at 909.
419 U.S. 393 (1975).
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fore, New York had to demonstrate that its classification was necessary
to accomplish a compelling state interest, a burden it could not
meet. 2 Furthermore, Justice Brennan's statement-that "only where a
State's law 'operates to penalize those persons

. . .

who have exercised

the constitutional right of interstate migration' is heightened scrutiny
triggered" 2 9'--constitutes a retrospective determination that Hooper and
Zobel actually involved a penalty on interstate migration. In those cases,
however, the Court had avoided the issue of whether the contested laws
operated to penalize interstate migration by employing rational basis analysis.
Also noteworthy is Justice Brennan's view that the "same guiding
principle" informs the analysis of all of the Court's decisions involving
distinctions drawn between older and new residents-"the right to migrate
protects residents of a state from being disadvantaged, or from being
treated differently, simply because of the timing of their migration, from
'
The Brennan plurality seemed to
other similarly situated residents." 292
reject, totally, length of state residence as a classifying factor for purposes
of equal protection analysis, a position which has the effect of giving
greater equality rights to the newly arrived than to the rest of the state's
population. The only possible explanation for such a position is an interest
in forging a national union in which state residence means little or nothing
in terms of access to benefits. The implications of this position for the
complex and untidy question of the state's ability to preserve its resources
for its own residents are particularly troubling, as are its implications for
the less consequential question of the state's ability to reward its "own. "293
Chief Justice Burger found the case directly controlled by Zobel and
Hooper, obviating the need to reach issues of heightened scrutiny vel
non or the right to travel, 94 and found the New York's scheme clearly
unable to "survive" even a rational basis test. 295-He purported to apply
rationality review but rejected all of New York's proffered justifications
as not served by preference for prior residents.296 Although he said nothing
290. 476 U.S. at 911.
291. Id. at 905 (citations omitted).
292. Id. at 904 (footnote omitted).
293. The Brennan plurality's position, however, is one that found support not just in its equal
protection analysis but in the Burger Court's privileges and immunities and commerce clause jurisdiction. See supra note 103.
294. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. at 912 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
295. "'[]f the statutory scheme cannot pass even the minimum rationality test, our inquiry ends.'"
Id. at 913 (quoting Hooper v. Bemaillo County Assessor, 472 U.S. at 618). "Under Hooper, it
seems clear that New York's provision is invalid on equal protection grounds." Soto-Lopez, 476
U.S. at 913 (Burger, C.J., concurring in the judgment).
296. Id. at 913-15. New York claimed that "the preference system encourage[d] New York
residents to enlist during times of war," id. at 913, that it provided "partial compensation to residents
for service during time of war," id. at 914, that it "encourage[d] past-resident veterans to settle in
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about legitimacy of purpose, he concluded that "[sitripped of its asserted
justifications, the [New York] statute suffers from the same constitutional
flaw as the Alaska statute in Zobel,"--that is "[t]he State may not favor
established residents over new residents based on the view that the State
may take care of 'its own,' if such is defined by prior residence. , 2 97 As
Justice O'Connor noted in her dissenting opinion, the Chief Justice's
position depended in part on the Zobel holding that a state's desire to
reward its citizens for past contributions is an illegitimate state purpose.298
Because the Zobel decision arose from unique facts, the decision's almost
imcomprehensible equal protection analysis and the Court's reflexible
condemnation of legislative purpose did not seem of great moment. Zobel
appeared to be sui generis in 1981 but Hooper and Soto-Lopez clearly
established the fallacy of that belief. It is difficult to discern the precise
content and meaning of the principle that has evolved from Edward's
protection of indigents from state prohibitions against their entry, Shapiro's condemnation of apportioning state benefits and services on the
basis of tax contributions as well as state efforts to deter migration,
Moreno's delegitimation of hostility to the unpopular, to Zobel, Hooper
and Soto-Lopez's invalidation of a state purpose to reward past contributions of its residents.
It is clear, however, that legislation that in some way disadvantages
newer residents vis-a-vis longer term residents offends the Constitution.
This is so however insignificant the benefit at issue and however large
the number of residents who are also disadvantaged by the classification.
The primary values that support this view are those arising from our
federal structure-interstate harmony and free mobility. The Court has
persisted, however, in analyzing the issues under the rubric of either equal
protection in general and/or of the right to travel in particular-even
though in so doing the Court departed from the reasoning of its prior
decisions involving the superprotected right of interstate mobility and the
barely protected interests infringed by social and economic legislation.
The reason for this break with precedent remains obscure. If these decisions mean that denial of any benefits of any nature is too high a price
to have paid for migrating, then the principle that emerges is that there
can be no state imposed costs to interstate migration. The reason why
that should be so does not emerge, however-not from precedents based
on the right of interestate mobility and not from precedents based on
equality.
New York after their military service ends," id., and that it was "targeted at a very special group
of veterans who have both knowledge of local affairs and valuable skills learned in the military, and
who therefore would make exceptional civil servants." Id. at 915.
297. Id. (quoting Hooper, 472 U.S. at 623).
298. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. at 919 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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IV. CONCLUSION

Beginning with Edwards v. California, the Court's doctrine on differential treatment of the newly arrived resident has echoed many strains
other than equality-an almost biblical concern with the poor and the
wretched of the earth, 2 a condemnation of xenophobia, 3" a romantic
view of the frontier,3 °' America's "predestined" territorial expansion3 2
and promotion of national cohesion.3 3 The Burger Court carried forward
protection of newcomers beyond not only that afforded by earlier courts
but also that afforded by its initial decisions in right to travel cases. The
result has been a distortion of equality doctrine that needs re-examination
by the Rehnquist Court in order to illuminate the exact nature of the evil
in rewarding "old-timers" for their contributions.
Determining the proper ends of government is the most difficult task
the Supreme Court undertakes because it calls into question the nature
and purpose of the power entrusted to the political actors.3 " When there
is no clear basis in the Constitution's text, history, structure or the Court's
own storehouse of precedents, a determination of illegitimacy of purpose
demands more justification than conclusory statements or a skewing of
precedent. When the Court decides that a limitation on the very competence of the legislature or the executive is in order, it should do so for
articulated reasons based on principles that transcend the immediate context. 305
299. See, e.g., Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 184-86 (1941) (Jackson, J., concurring).
300. See supra note 107.
301. See, e.g., J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 178 (1980), who notes, in discussing the right
to relocate cases, that "of course the symbolism, and indeed the reality, of 'the frontier' took much
of its sustenance from the notion that a person should have the option of pulling up stakes and
starting over elsewhere."
302. See, e.g., Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. at 183 (Jackson J., concurring).
303. See, e.g., id. at 181 (Douglas, J., concurring), "But to allow such an exception [a state
right to curtail the right of free movement based on indigence] to be engrafted on the right of national
citizenship would be to contravene every conception of national unity." See also supra notes 54-57
and note 241.
304. Debate over the proper ends of government and the reach of legislative authority predates
the Constitution and continues to be at the heart of the opposing views of judicial review and
interpretive methodology. Corwin has noted that since the founding of state legislatures the judiciary
has been confronted with reconciling opposing principles: legislative sovereignty limited only by a
written constitution and judicial protection against unbridled use of legislative power. Corwin, The
Doctrine of Due Process of Law Before the Civil War, 24 HARV. L. REV. 366, 463 (1911).
305. It is futile, however, even to postulate a unifying theory that informed the Burger Court's
treatment of newcomers given its predilection for both overt and covert balancing in so much of its
constitutional jurisprudence. It is possible to identify the values protected or promoted by individual
justices as a result of this ad hoc approach, even if not always possible to locate their source. While
value identification warrants attention if given values play a dominant role in the Court's jurisprudence, identification of a value that is not widely or consistently shared is not very helpful in
determining the theoretical underpinnings of the Court's work. The exception is that it buttresses
the conclusion that there is no easily identifiable, much less coherent or consistent, collecti'e
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The most egregious error in the trilogy of decisions examined here,
however, is the mockery they make of a meaningful notion of equality." °
They represent an unexplicable break both with the Court's deference to
legislative social and economic policy choices 7 and with established
right-to-migrate-and-resettle doctrine.308 The right to travel cases triggered
strict scrutiny because the durational residency requirements at issue put
the newly arrived resident in a position of having to pay a very high-cost
for having relocated or choose one right at the expense of another. A law
which forces a choice between fundamental rights clearly would impinge
upon both rights. Dunn v. Blumstein, ° for example, involved the Hobson's choice of exercising one's right to migrate and thereby losing, at
least temporarily, the right to vote or forfeiture of the right to take up
residence in a new state in order to retain the franchise. Zobel involved
no choice of any kind since the only way to receive this particular benefita share in an economic windfall-was to move to Alaska. In effect, the
scheme offered an inducement to migrate, not a barrier. Hooper involved
a choice only for (1) veterans (2) who were eligible for benefits in their
home state (3) if they moved to a state with no benefits or benefits
restricted on the basis of fixed date residency. Soto-Lopez involved the
same choices not between two fundamental rights but between a veteran's
moving or not moving. The fact, however, that the legislative schemes
in Zobel, Hooper, and Soto-Lopez did not present a choice between
retaining one constitutional right at the expense of another is not conclusive. I do not suggest that even if an interest is not constitutionally
viewpoint of the role of the states in a federal system, the extent of individual freedom from
government regulation and control, or the extent to which majoritarian values can prevail against
claims of minorities seeking protection or exemption from oppressive governmental action resulting
from hostility or indifference.
306. In all three decisions there is a telescoping of means and ends that results in an unwarranted
and overbroad condemnation of a benign legislative purpose because of the legislation's impact on
newcomers. Although often difficult to distinguish, there is a constitutionally significant difference
between means and ends. See, e.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 884
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) "melding the proper two-step inquiry regarding the state's purpose and
the classification's relationship to that purpose into a single unarticulated judgment ... enables the
Court to characterize state goals . . . as improper solely because it disagrees with the concededly
rational means . . . selected by the legislature."
307. Equal protection challenges to economic regulation receiving minimal review include Bowens
v. Owens, 476 U.S. 340 (1986); Minnesota v. Cloverleaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981);
Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221 (1981); U.S. R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166
(1980); New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979); Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S.
93 (1979); New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976); Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia,
427 U.S. 307 (1976); Daniel v. Family Sec. Life Ins. Co., 336 U.S. 220 (1949); Railway Express
Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949); Kotch v. Board of River Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552
(1947); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948). Cf. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S.
422 (1982) (state's classification of employment discrimination claims invalid on minimum rationality
grounds).
308. See supra notes 36-123 and accompanying text.
309. 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
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mandated-for example, the welfare and medical benefits at stake in
Shapiro and Maricopa-government choices as to recipients may be
arbitrary or motivated by unprincipled hostility to particular groups. Associational rights as well as the freedom to have unorthodox views are
implicated when government power is used to fence out undesirables.
Clearly, there must be principled limits on the power of the state to
discriminate between old and new residents but the extreme protection
afforded the most recently arrived in Zobel, Hooper and Soto-Lopez is
difficult to justify. The effect of Zobel is that babies as young as one year
of age are entitled to and receive an equal share of the distributions of
the Prudhoe Fund.3"' There is no way, in a just or rational constitutional
universe, this result can coexist with the fact that Dandridge means an
impoverished child's need for minimum subsistence is beside the point
if her family has exceeded a state's maximum grant size. In short, Shapiro
and Maricopaare cases in which government restrictions on the eligibility
of newcomers for state created interests impinge on the needy in a particularly cruel way. In contrast, there is nothing in our trilogy of decisions
to indicate that the poor were singled out in any way or would disproportionately suffer the consequences of the distribution schemes at issue.
These decisions suggest then, that newly arrived state residents are to
receive extraordinary protection even if there is no evidence of racial and
ethnic animosity or of an effort to fence out the needy. Justice Frankfurter
reminded us that " [t]o recognize marked differences that exist in fact is
living law; to disregard practical differences and concentrate on some
abstract identities is lifeless logic." ''
It is beyond dispute that the newly arrived state citizens are often those
seeking a better life after economic hard times have befallen their former
home states. It is also true that restrictions on newly arrived state citizens
may be triggered by the same racial and ethnic hostility that animated so
many of the restrictions visited upon aliens before the Court began to use
equality principles" 2 as well as federal preemption doctrines"' to strike
310. New York Times, Feb. 17, 1987, at A13, col. I.
311. Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457, 472 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
312. Because federal law either excluded certain nationalities or set quotas for immigration based
on national origin resulting in racial classifications, see, e.g., the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882,
22 Stat. 58 which was in effect until 1934 and 43 Stat. 153 (1924) which enacted a national origin
quota system and was in effect until 1965, state laws which denied economic benefits or opportunities,
ownership of land and use of natural resources on the basis of alienage created de facto racial or
nationality classifications which received little judicial scrutiny until 1948. See, e.g., Heim v.
McCall, 239 U.S. 175 (1915); accord Crane v. New York, 239 U.S. 195 (1915) (statute requiring
citizens to be hired on public works upheld); Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 138 (1914) (aliens
validly prohibited from killing wild game); McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391 (1876) (shellfish);
Terrance v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197 (1923) (ownership of land); cf. Takahashi v. Fish & Game
Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948) (ended the Court's tolerance of state imposition of discriminatory
burdens on aliens).
313. Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948) (states lack power to add or
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down some of the more egregious state discrimination. On the other hand,
many newly arrived state residents are mobile, affluent and highly skilled
individuals who may have been induced to relocate by better economic
opportunities-not a striking example of a group particularly deserving
of constitutional solicitude under any of the Court's doctrines which
justify heightened scrutiny.
It is also a mistake to assume that all dislike of newcomers is unfounded.
Some of the resentment is based on the reality that newcomers are not
always dust bowl refugees but are quick buck operators who ravage the
landscape and plunder natural resources." 4 Those who live in states that
have gained rather than lost population in recent years know that newcomers often reap the benefits of arduous and even dangerous pioneering
efforts of others without recognition of and appreciation for those efforts.
Some newcomers display an arrogance toward the "backwardness" and
"unenlightened" state of the "natives" that can be deservedly galling to
those so perceived. It is sometimes the newcomers who feel more equal
than others, Justice Brennan to the contrary notwithstanding. But, whatever the individual merits of individual newcomers, they can hardly be
considered the kind of group disfavored by virtue of circumstances beyond
its control, any disfavoring classification involving which "reflect[s] deepseated prejudice rather than legislative rationality in pursuit of some
legitimate objective."" 5 In short, newcomers do not represent the "kind
of 'class or caste"' that the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to
protect.3 16 Arguably, the Court's condemnation of the states' purposes to
reward past contributions is intended as a prophylaxis against the covert
disadvantaging of racial and ethnic minorities through the use of classifications based on longevity of residence. It is unarguable that certain
classifications "supply a reason to infer antipathy" and are a "touchstone
for pervasive but often subtle discrimination."317 It is also true that
subtract from conditions imposed by Congress on admission and naturalization of aliens). See also
Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1 (1982) (state university's policy denying eligibility for preferential instate fee and tuition violated Supremacy Clause).
314. "Throughout its history, from the days of the Gold Rush to the recent oil pipeline period,
Alaska has been prone to the phenomenon that large numbers of people from without the state move
in, derive great financial and other benefits from the state's resources and opportunities, and then
move out to enjoy the fruits of their labors elsewhere. This obviously results in a great drain of
financial and other resources from the state. . . .Although the problem is not unique to Alaska, the
extent to which this problem affects the state is probably unparalleled." Zobel, 619 P.2d at 459-60
(footnotes omitted).
It should also be should be remembered that the large scale land erosion of the 1930's dustbowl
has been caused by the plowing up of millions of acres of grasslands in order to cash in on the
market for winter wheat during World War 1,a fact which led to environmental disaster when coupled
with an entirely predictable drought, 216 n.14.
315. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 n. 14 (1982).
316. Id. at 217 n.14.
317. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 398 (1979).
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"[cilassifying persons according to their race is more likely to reflect
racial prejudice than legitimate public concerns." 3" 8 Classifications based
on residency, however, may reflect any number of legitimate concerns
and yet the Court has in effect created a requirement that these classifications undergo the same level of scrutiny as racial classifications. Not
only is this result difficult to understand, it also represents a waste of the
Court's moral and political capital that could be better spent on curbing
more egregious injustices.
It is possible that legislation which excludes the newly arrived resident
on the basis of contribution to the state may be a screen for a more clearly
forbidden discrimination-for example, against Asiatics or Latinos. However, in many areas, for example the Southwest, it is the Latino and
Native American population which has the claim to the longest local roots
(and which may have ample justification for any antipathy to newcomers).
Nor can the Court's hypersensitivity to possible discrimination against
newcomers be squared with its insistence that discriminatory effect is not
necessarily proof of discriminatory purpose in claims of racial" 9 and sex
based inequality.32 ° By invalidating legislative ends the Court has come
close to a per se invalidation of classifications based on durational residency or presence in the state on a given date without requiring demonstration of a hostile purpose.
The paradigm for the development of the Courts' equality jurisprudence
has been racial discrimination, which is as it had to be, given the moral
imperative of ending any governmental role or complicity in the expression of racial hostility or inferiority as well as the circumstances that
necessitated and attended the birth of the Fourteenth Amendment. Nor is
it inappropriate that the reach of the Equal Protection Clause was extended
to other groups who had been despised, outcast or relegated to subsurvient
positions. Even though different in kind as well as degree, there are
sufficient parallels to the suffering of Black Americans, to support condemnation of legislative ends to exclude, subjugate or patronize such
groups. This is so even if nothing more than a selective subsidy is involved. The newly arrived state resident, however, is not usually mistreated, reduced to a status of inferiority or subject to widespread hostility
in the same way members of racial ethnic or religious minorities, Native
Americans, homosexuals, women or newcomers from foreign nations,
particularly the third world, often are. The extreme protection afforded
318. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984) (citing Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S.
256, 272 (1979)).
319. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (plaintiff challenging a non-race-specific
enactment must establish discriminatory purpose).
320. Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979) (plaintiff challenging a non-genderspecific enactment must establish discriminatory purpose).
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the recently arrived is a product of the Court's myopic view of our
Nation's history which does not accord with its complicated reality.
By subjecting to Constitutional review the policy choices open to legislatures when their enactments impinge in some way upon the more
recently arrived state resident, the Court has used notions of equality to
elevate newcomers to an unwarranted status as extraordinarily protected,
while at the same time afforded far less protection to other groups which
have suffered far more egregious wrongs. It remains to be seen whether
under the leadership of Chief Justice Rehnquist the Court will retreat
from invalidating governmental ends to strike down acts of the political
branches that disadvantage newly arrived state residents in some inconsequential way, or whether it will continue to subject classifications based
on duration or date of residence to a new level of scrutiny that is, in the
words of Justice Blackmun, "neither minimal nor strict, but strange unto
itself. "32

321. Williams v. Vermont, 472 U.S. 14, 31, (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (1985).
The Court has granted review to two cases involving equal protection challenges to the method
of assessing property for ad valorem taxation. Property is assessed at a value of 50% of the purchase
price contained in the deed, which results in a large increase in the assessed value of recently
purchased property and relatively low assessed value for property that has not recently been sold.
Arguably, this method favors oldtimers over newcomers. Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County
Comm'n of Webster County and East Kentucky Energy Corp. v. Webster County, 109 S. Ct. 633
(1989).

